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Chapter 1
Introduction
Between 1830 and 1924, over 35 million immigrants arrived to the United
States from Europe. This so-called “century of immigration” ended rather
abruptly in the early 1920s, when the United States enacted what became
known as the Quota Acts, that significantly limited immigration from Eu-
rope. The first of these acts, passed in 1921, introduced quotas for all Euro-
pean immigrants, cutting the total to about 350,000 European immigrants
per year. This temporary legislation was superseded by the Immigration Act
of 1924, which not only made the quotas stricter but also calculated them
in a manner designed to favor Northern and Western European immigrants.
It also altogether barred immigration from Japan.
With this legislation, a fundamental American policy was turned on its
head. Until the late 19th century, the United States had had a strong com-
mitment, on both economic and ideological grounds, to free immigration.
Economically, immigrants were seen as not only a boon but a necessity; ide-
ologically, they strengthened the image of America as a land of opportunity
composed of the most enterprising elements of all European nations. As
early as 1782, Hector St. John de Cre`vecoueur, himself a French immigrant,
had famously declared that
1
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He is an American who, leaving behind him all ancient prejudices
and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has
embraced, the government he obeys, and the new rank he holds [. . . ]
Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, whose
labours and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world.1
This idea of American identity as a matter of choice and action, and Ameri-
can nationality as a blend of the best from all peoples, persisted throughout
the 19th century and well into the 20th as well. There was, however, an
underlying assumption that the “blend” would be composed of white new-
comers: naturalization was not granted to non-whites.2
Accordingly, when concern about the benefits of immigration began to
spread in the late 19th century, the first to feel the changing winds of policy
were the Chinese, whose entry was prohibited in 1882; in 1917, the creation
of an “Asian Barred Zone” prevented the admittance of all Asians except
the Japanese, whose immigration was regulated through diplomatic means.
The first serious proposals to limit European immigration came in the
1890s, a time of serious economic depression and general unease about the
future of the country, and also a time when the shift in the sources of
immigration from Northern and Western Europe to Southern and Eastern
Europe began to be apparent. This shift, combined with economic problems,
disturbed many observers, but was especially unsettling to the old-stock
New Englanders who saw their cities increasingly populated by immigrants
who seemed to them ignorant and utterly alien. One of these patricians,
the Congressman Henry Cabot Lodge, in 1891 put forth a bill to impose a
literacy test on all immigrants.
Between that initial proposal of the literacy test and its final enactment
1Quoted in Gerstle, Liberty , p. 524; emphasis in original.
2After 1870, persons of African descent could be naturalized, but the assumption was
that their numbers would be so small as to be practically non-existent. See section 3.2.1
and Ngai, Architecture.
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in the Immigration Act of 1917, the attitude toward immigrants swung
from fear to confidence and back again. Faith in the immigrants’ assimila-
tion alternated with suspicions concerning their loyalty to America and their
willingness to adopt an American lifestyle. Belief in the economic benefits
of immigration occasionally outweighed and occasionally was submerged by
belief in their adverse impact on the society as a whole. The Americaniza-
tion movement, a systematic attempt at immigrant assimilation that began
around 1907 and reached its height in 1919, was one response to the con-
flict of economic benefits and cultural threat. At the same time, however,
various versions of the literacy test were repeatedly introduced in Congress,
indicating the persistence of the idea; moreover, a favorable attitude to
limiting immigration was beginning to take hold even in the traditionally
immigrant-hungry areas of the South and the West.
The Quota Acts, then, were preceded by a lengthy if erratic growth of re-
strictionist sentiment. Nevertheless, in both form and scale they represented
a radical departure from earlier ideas: all previous regulations of European
immigration had concerned the individual characteristics of the immigrant,
and never before had the number of entries per year been dictated by law.
The turn of the tide was remarkably complete: by the last stages of the Con-
gressional debate there were few groups in America (apart from immigrants
themselves) that raised voices of serious opposition. Even those who wished
for a different kind of law often conceded that restriction in some form was
necessary.
A variety of factors combined to bring about this consensus regarding
the need to drastically curb immigration. Probably the most striking feature
of the support for restriction is the diversity of its sources: patrician New
Englanders, labor unionists, Republicans, Democrats, black leaders, Klans-
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men, industrialists and eugenists all seemed to expect some benefit from
limiting the influx of newcomers. All of these groups emphasized different
aspects of the question: eugenists felt that America’s racial and biological
composition—and therefore the country’s future—were at risk; labor union-
ists blamed the immigrant for bringing down wages; the elites said that
immigrants of lower-class and culturally alien backgrounds would destroy
American institutions and culture. In other words, immigration restriction
could be supported on such diverse grounds that a group which might find
some aspect of the law less than perfect or even distasteful often had rea-
son to commend its other features. Industrialists, for example, would have
preferred more flexibility, but often agreed that restriction nevertheless was
a good thing; similarly, black leaders condemned the racist implications of
the act but felt that a smaller labor pool would certainly be desirable.
The debate over the Quota Acts moved largely on the level of ideol-
ogy and emotion: advocates of restriction emphasized the need to preserve
American culture and national unity, while opponents appealed to tradi-
tional ideals which painted America as the haven for all those “huddled
masses yearning to breathe free,” as the poem engraved on the Statue of
Liberty loftily declared. Nevertheless, a number of more tangible factors
contributed to the passage of immigration restriction.
By the 1920s, the demand for agricultural settlers and unskilled indus-
trial labor, which had largely been the driving force of immigration, had
decreased dramatically. The frontier was now closed, agriculture suffered
from overproduction, and major labor-intensive infrastructural projects had
been completed. Technological innovations and better communications had
created an industrial society that increasingly relied on machines rather
than men to do the work. The First World War, by practically closing off
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European immigration, had accelerated the focus on capital-intensive pro-
duction; and, it had drawn Southern blacks to industrial jobs in the North,
making manufacturers aware of a domestic labor pool that could supplant
immigrants. A comparison with other countries of high immigration—such
as Canada, Australia and Argentina—underlines the importance of long-
term economic factors in producing a restriction-friendly climate: while all
of these countries expressed concern about the immigrants’ impact on soci-
ety, none of them enacted restrictions as strict as those in the United States,
probably because of their greater need for agricultural and industrial labor.
Economic factors, mechanization, and falling farm prices were occasion-
ally noted in the debate, but they were clearly not the main issue: any
economic argument for immigration, for example, could be immediately dis-
pelled by warning that continued immigration would change America so
fundamentally that no economic profit could compensate for the loss. The
most consistent arguments of the restrictionists focused on the size and
character of immigration. Such huge numbers of Europeans, they claimed,
wanted to escape the war-weary continent that the impact on the American
economy and American culture would be intolerable. They also argued that
the quality of immigrants had deteriorated—that the new immigrants from
Southern and Eastern Europe were racially and culturally inferior to the
Western and Northern Europeans that had constituted the bulk of immi-
grants up to about 1890.
Intense concern over the fate of the nation, and over change itself, sur-
rounded the debate on immigration restriction. This led many contemporary
observers to argue that restrictionism was simply one more manifestation
of the same impulse that passed the Prohibition Amendment, condemned
short skirts, sang the praises of rural America, and advocated a return to
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“old-time religion.” This impulse, said writers like H.L. Mencken and Walter
Lippman, was simply the dying gasp of traditional, rural, Victorian America,
trying to stave off the inevitable arrival of modernity.
The debate on the Quota Acts certainly lends some support to this view:
congressmen, journalists, and social scientists over and over again repeated
that it was time for America to stop and catch its breath, to “take stock” of
its population, to devise an immigration policy that would prevent America
from “losing its soul” and becoming “de-Americanized.” In other words,
there was clearly a widespread sentiment that the pace of change was too
rapid, and that immigrants were at least partly responsible for this.
But immigration restriction was in many senses as much a part of “moder-
nity” as it was a reaction against it. First of all, the Immigration Act of
1924 established an intricate bureaucracy for consular inspection of prospec-
tive immigrants. Second, many of the advocates—especially eugenists, New
England elites, and some congressmen—placed great weight on the argument
that America needed a “scientific” and efficient immigration policy, and that
this was exactly what the new legislation would provide. Third, the under-
pinnings of the quota system lay in eugenics, which drew the greater part
of its impetus from an interpretation of Darwin’s theory of evolution and
natural selection.
All of these three aspects indicate that the law’s designers were not so
much trying to recreate an earlier, simpler era as they were determined
to define and fashion an acceptable modern one. They had few qualms
about new scientific theories, no matter how seriously those theories might
undermine traditional interpretations of the world (after all, the issue of
Darwinian evolution versus a literal interpretation of the biblical account
of creation has often been cited as one of the major controversies of the
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twenties). And, while they praised the virtues of simple farm and village life,
they also implicitly accepted that America had become a modern, complex
society that could not function without a certain amount of efficient state
bureaucracy.
In the debate over the first Quota Act, many opponents still argued that
no new restrictions were necessary and the rumors of an immigrant “flood”
were greatly exaggerated. The temporary nature of the first Act, however,
probably eased its passage, and by 1924, there was fairly strong consensus
over the need for a permanent and restrictive immigration policy. The con-
troversy in 1924 arose mainly from the proposed form of restrictions: the
quotas that discriminated against Southern and Eastern Europeans and the
exclusion of Japanese immigrants spurred heated debate. Recent research,
too, has emphasized the racist ideology behind the 1924 Act and the support
it received from contemporary race-thinkers and eugenists.3
The influence of eugenics certainly was important and the prejudices
embedded in the Act are not in doubt. But while racism may have been suf-
ficient to shut out Japanese immigrants, it hardly suffices to explain the drive
against Europeans. The way in which congressmen spoke about Japanese
exclusion was very different from the way they discussed the relative merits
of European nationalities. The alleged racial inferiority of Southern and
Eastern Europeans remained controversial throughout the debate, and the
racial case against them never fully distinguished itself from arguments based
on economic or cultural aspects. By contrast, the racial otherness of the
Japanese and their consequent undesirability as citizens was treated as a
self-evident fact, one that did not require further argumentation. This view
was not contested even by those who most eloquently denounced the at-
3See e.g. King, Making Americans; Ngai, Architecture.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
tempt to put Europeans into separate racial categories, and consequently
the discussion on Japanese exclusion centered on the correct legislative or
diplomatic way to accomplish it.
Popular stereotypes did much to buttress the “scientific” racism directed
at Europeans, although—as many opponents of restriction pointed out—
the claim that the newest arrivals were inferior to those who came before
had been advanced over and over again in the nation’s history. What dis-
tinguished the 1920s from earlier eras was the relative absence of strong
opposition to restriction. Especially industry, which in earlier times had
insisted on substantial immigrant labor, was no longer united on the ques-
tion. Another important factor in creating the consensus against immi-
grants was the prevailing spirit of “Americanism.” More popular than the
racist view of European immigrants, Americanism (and its flip side, un-
Americanism) functioned as a catch-all concept that could always be evoked
against foreigners—and against American dissenters. Through declarations
of Americanism and accusations of un-Americanism, anti-immigrant agita-
tion also contributed to the control of the domestic population, both by
declaring activities such as labor organizing (especially in its more radical
variants) “un-American” and alien in origin, and by shifting the blame for
various social problems from politicians or businessmen to the immigrants.
Immigration restriction, then, resonated with Americans for many rea-
sons. The conditions that had made immigration essential—a need for agri-
cultural settlers and unskilled labor—had been replaced by an increasingly
urban, mechanized society. Intense nationalism, buttressed by wartime pro-
paganda, created an atmosphere that was distrustful of everything foreign,
and many things domestic. The propensity of new immigrants to stay in
cities not only made them more conspicuous but also underscored the ur-
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banization of America—and made both the immigrant and the big city seem
perhaps even more alien to many Southern and Western Americans. Var-
ious new theories seemed to confirm the popular ideas that Southern and
Eastern Europeans were different, inferior, and unassimilable. In the public
mind, immigrants were also associated with radicalism and Bolshevism, and
in the anti-union climate after the Red Scare, this probably did as much to
discredit them as their strange customs and languages. And finally, immi-
gration restriction provided many groups and politicians with a clear-cut,
concrete issue that could, after all, be fairly simply solved.
In examining the debate surrounding the Quota Acts, I have focused
mostly on the Congressional discussions, the views of those who appeared
before the House or Senate Committees on Immigration, and the writings
of major eugenists of the time. Using the Congressional debates as research
material is, of course, wrought with a number of problems: much that was
said may have been directed more to the voting public or the congressman’s
constituency rather than for the benefit of his fellow members of Congress.
Nearly certainly, too, many congressmen downplayed their prejudices, pre-
ferring to draw attention to their lofty sentiments about American ideals
and pay lip service to their concern for the American working man. And in-
deed, an examination of the popular magazines and publications of popular
organizations tends to show much more forthright and unabashed variety of
anti-immigrant sentiment, and two issues that rarely entered the Congres-
sional debate, anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism, probably nevertheless
played a major role in creating popular support for the Quota Acts. But as
those who sat in Congress and those who consulted them and wrote scientific
and semi-scientific works on the subject of immigration certainly had more
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power to influence the final form of the law, I feel justified in focusing more
on them. For the same reason, and because of their significant majority, the
arguments and people in favor of the law receive the bulk of attention here,
and the opposing side is only examined inasmuch as it is necessary to unfold
the restrictionist case.
Another problem connected with focusing on the Congressional debate,
or indeed on any short-term debate, is that many underlying and perhaps
extremely influential issues are never discussed as the participants prefer
to score easier rhetorical points. Therefore, to provide a background and
a context for the Quota Acts debate, I have used secondary sources to try
to examine both the immigration laws of other countries and American
domestic developments at some length.
Chapter 2
Background
Although the Quota Acts of the 1920s can be described as the end of an era,
this does not mean that nativist sentiment was a product of the twenties or
even that its appearance on the scene of national politics was by any means
sudden. As John Higham has shown, nativist sentiment had deep roots in
American society, dating back to the earliest days of the republic. Hostility
to foreigners has usually flared up in economically and/or politically insecure
times, and has often served to deflect the potential for class conflict inherent
in them to the less disruptive goal of diminishing the rights of the immigrant.
2.1 Immigration to the United States
At the time of the first census in 1790, the white population was predom-
inantly of English origin. Sixty percent of the white residents of the con-
tinental United States came from England; about eight percent came from
Scotland. Other white national or linguistic stocks consisted of Irish (9.5
percent), German (8.6 percent) and Dutch (3.1 percent); Swedish and Span-
ish persons comprised less than one percent each and 6.8 percent were not
classified. About 20 percent of the population were of African origin. Many
11
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of the European groups were concentrated in particular areas, so that a third
of Pennsylvania’s population, for instance, was German, and a sixth of New
York and New Jersey was Dutch in origin.1
Between 1820 and 1924 the influx of immigrants grew steadily, with the
exceptions of the Civil War period, the depression of the 1890s, and the
years of the First World War. The earliest arrivals of this “century of im-
migration” were Irish, German and Scandinavian; the Irish comprised well
over thirty percent of immigrants up to 1860, while the Germans totaled
about 25–35 percent between 1830 and 1890.2 Scandinavians, of course,
never reached the numbers that Germans or Irish did, although in propor-
tion to the population of the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden and
Denmark) their migration was in fact greater than that of the Germans.
A total of 2.1 million Scandinavians arrived in the U.S. between 1820 and
1920; the bulk of this movement occurred between 1865 and 1910.3
After about 1880, the numbers of Southern and Eastern European immi-
grants began to increase dramatically. Only ca. 55,000 Italians, for example,
had arrived in the 1870s, while in the 1880s they totaled over 300,000. Be-
tween 1880 and 1920, over four million Italians arrived in the United States.
Other prominent groups from the Mediterranean were the Greeks, the Turks
(about 300,000 each) and the Armenians (about 100,000). Data on East
European arrivals are more difficult to interpret because ethnic groups and
national boundaries, as they were perceived, rarely coincided. Russia and
Austria-Hungary sent over three million immigrants to the U.S. between
1901 and 1910, but Americans (and the immigrants themselves) spoke of
1Daniels, Coming , pp. 66–68.
2Daniels, Coming , tables on pages 129 and 146. The Irish immigration continued to
comprise over 10 percent of the total until 1900; Germans still held 13.7 percent of the
total in 1901-1910, after which their share dropped to low single digits.
3Daniels, Coming , pp. 164–165.
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Magyars, Slovaks, Poles and Jews. Statistics of the mother tongue of first
and second generation immigrants in the 1910 census showed about 1.7 mil-
lion Polish speakers; about half a million Magyars arrived between 1890 and
1914; and an estimated three million Eastern European Jews were in the
U.S. in 1924.4
Immigration from England and Scotland continued throughout this pe-
riod, although it received little attention; English immigrants were consid-
ered easily assimilable and aroused little opposition or interest. English and
Scottish immigrants were also fewer than either Irish or German immigrants:
between 1820 and 1951, about 3.5 million English and Scottish immigrants
arrived in the U.S., as opposed to about 4.6 million Irish and 6.3 million
Germans. By the late 19th century, the numbers of English immigrants
(and of other Western European immigrants as well) were decreasing, and
the quota allotted to Great Britain in the Immigration Act of 1924 was in
fact larger than the number of would-be British immigrants.5
Over 90 percent of the immigrants who arrived during the century of
immigration were Europeans, and much of the history of immigration to
the U.S., until quite recently, has focused almost exclusively on European
arrivals. But the slave trade, of course, brought a significant number of
Africans to the United States. There were, too, arrivals from Asia and
the Western Hemisphere; these immigrants (especially Asians) tended to be
concentrated in very few states, making them conspicuous despite relatively
small numbers.6
Chinese immigration began roughly with the California gold rush in
1849, and between that time and the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion
4Daniels, Coming , pp. 188–189, 202–206, 216–233.
5Taft and Robbins, International Migrations, pp. 390, 416–417.
6Daniels, Coming , p. 238.
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Act in 1882 about 300,000 Chinese entered the United States. There were,
however, probably a great number of repeated entries; the census of 1880
showed about 105,000 Chinese living in the United States.7 Of these, over
two thirds lived in California; only three percent lived outside the Western
states or territories.8
Like the Chinese, Japanese immigrants were heavily concentrated in the
West, especially the Pacific Coast. The Japanese began arriving to the
mainland U.S. in significant numbers in the 1890s, both directly from Japan
and from Hawaii (which the U.S. annexed in 1898 and where about 30,000
Japanese had been employed on plantations). The census of 1920 showed
about 110,000 Japanese in the contiguous United States; of these, 85 percent
lived on the Pacific Coast.9
Statistics relative to immigration from the Western Hemisphere are much
less reliable than those regarding European and Asian entrants: crossing the
land border was, obviously, much simpler than undertaking a long sea voy-
age, and controls were lax: for example, there was no Border Patrol on the
Mexican border until 1924. Still, about 720,000 Mexicans were counted as
entering between the Mexican Revolution of 1909 and 1930, roughly tripling
the number of foreign-born Mexican Americans. Most Mexicans stayed in
the Southwest as agricultural laborers, although the First World War and
the subsequent restrictions on European immigration also drew significant
numbers to industrial jobs in the North.10
7“Chinese” was a racial category and included both the foreign-born and their descen-
dants.
8Daniels, Coming , pp. 239–241.
9“Japanese,” too, was a racial classification and included both immigrants and those
born in the United States. Daniels, Coming , pp. 250–251.
10Daniels, Coming , pp. 309–310. It should be noted that many Mexican Americans
were not immigrants, but had remained in the areas annexed by the United States after
Mexican-American War in 1846–1847. Also, although Mexicans composed well over half of
the immigrants from southern Western Hemisphere, immigrants from West Indies totaled
about 400,000 between 1820 and 1930, and there were also immigrants from Central and
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An immigrant group from north of the border, French Canadians, were
almost as numerous as the Mexicans; like the Mexicans, they too stayed
fairly close to the border, settling in the New England states. Again, statis-
tics are unreliable, but the census figures show that in 1890 there were about
520,000 French Canadians (first and second generation) in the U.S.; by 1920
this figure had increased to almost 850,000. Most of these immigrants came
to work in the growing industries of the New England states, and their ac-
culturation was fairly slow due to both the steady pace of migration and
the ease of visiting their homeland. This provoked considerable resentment
among the native American population. The French Canadians, like the
Chinese, were often seen as sojourners who had no intention of becoming
“true” Americans.11
2.2 Anti-Immigrant Sentiment before the 1890s
One of the earliest attempts to incorporate nativist sentiment into the leg-
islative body came in 1798 in the form of the Alien and Sedition Acts, which
were a response to the unease caused by the French Revolution. The Acts
“were intended to make citizenship more difficult, create an alien registra-
tion system, give the President the power to order the apprehension and
deportation of aliens, and criminalize a broad range of expression opposed
to the U.S. government.” There was substantial opposition to these laws,
and no immigrant was in fact deported under the Alien Act, which was
allowed to expire in 1800.12
The fear of revolutionary forces that motivated the Alien and Sedition
Acts may seem incongruous; after all, the United States itself had only
South America.
11Daniels, Coming , pp.258–260.
12Hong, Origin, pp. 3-4.
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recently come into being through revolution. However, as John Higham
puts it, “[i]n retrospect, the spirit of ’76 could appear even more sober than
it was, and vastly different from the temper of foreign revolutions.”13 Far
from dying with the expiration of the Alien Act, this fear of revolution (and
of radicalism in general) would continue to influence immigration policy for
decades—indeed, centuries—to come.
The next wave of nativism appeared in the 1830s, this time directed not
at radicals but at Catholics. Anti-Catholicism had been a feature of Amer-
ican society since colonial times, and as increasing numbers of Irish and
German Catholics entered the country from the 1820s onward, it was trans-
formed from “largely rhetorical” to “a major social and political force.”14
The Catholic Church seemed “dangerously un-American”15 in its authoritar-
ian structures, Catholic immigrants were seen as bowing to a foreign power,
and Catholicism in general brought to disrepute by popular “expose´s” of
the immoral proceedings taking place in convents.16
Anti-Catholicism was strongly connected to the temperance movement,
since Catholic immigrants—coming from cultures where the saloon or the
beer garden was much more of a conventional social gathering place than
in America—were among the most vigorous opponents of anti-liquor laws.
Moreover, it was also tied to general dissatisfaction at immigrants’ political
13Higham, Strangers, p. 7, emphasis in original.
14Daniels, Coming , p. 267.
15Higham, Strangers, p. 6.
16Higham, Strangers; Anbinder, Ideology . The most prominent of these expose´s was
Maria Monk’s Awful Disclosures of the Hotel Dieu Nunnery of Montreal, published in
1836 and widely read; the publication of a sequel (Further Disclosures) indicates the
book’s popularity. Monk claimed that during the time she had lived at the convent she
had been sexually taken advantage of, and that when she became pregnant she had decided
to flee to avoid having her child killed by the priests (according to her, a standard practice
at the convent). Her “evidence” was discredited fairly soon, however, once it became clear
that she had in fact never stayed at a convent, and especially once she became pregnant
again. (Monk, 1998); (Daniels, 1990).
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power and allegations of corruption and machine politics.17 Anti-Catholic
sentiment was especially violent in the eastern cities, and drew much of
its support from the working class, incited to fear and hatred by church
leaders and street-corner orators. In the 1850s, the anti-foreign and anti-
Catholic American Party (aka the Know-Nothing Party) reached its climax
through populist condemnations of politicians and calls for national unity,
spiced with the many-faceted accusations leveled at Catholics.18 The Know-
Nothing party eventually dissolved as a result of internal conflicts; there is,
however, evidence that the Republican party, which emerged in this period,
inherited a significant number of Know-Nothing supporters.
While the specifics of the connections between nativism and antebellum
Republican politics are somewhat controversial, it is fairly well established
that nativism as a political force was significant enough to require Republi-
cans to take it into account in devising electoral strategy. Especially at the
state level, concessions were made to nativist opinion, partly because of ide-
ological similarities between Republicans and nativists and partly because
of political expediency.19 Neither the Know-Nothing anti-immigrant agita-
tion or the Republicans’ concessions to nativism, however, led to significant
legislation regarding immigration, and the force of the nativist movement
declined after 1856.20
17Foner, Free Soil ; Boyer, Urban Masses.
18Anbinder, Ideology ; Higham, Strangers; Daniels, Coming .
19Gienapp, Nativism. Gienapp also points out that while nativist agitation was not
entirely limited to Catholics during this period, the Republican party focused on anti-
Catholicism in its nativist planks, because it feared that blanket condemnations of foreign-
ers might drive away the immigrant support it had managed to attract. Many Protestant
immigrants, however, shared the natives’ fear of Catholics, and as Catholic immigrants
were unlikely to leave the Democratic party in any case, anti-Catholicism was a “safe”
way to attract nativist support.
20The Know-Nothings focused on tightening naturalization laws, not on restricting en-
try. There are, however, indications that the violence of the anti-Catholic movement led to
a reduction in immigration from Catholic countries as prospective emigrants heard about
the unwelcoming atmosphere in the U.S; see Cohn, Nativism. In addition, Calavita, U.S.
Immigration Law has argued that there was significant popular demand for restriction.
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Anti-Catholicism did not disappear, but the question of immigration
was subsumed in the much more pressing issues of the Civil War, and the
following years of expansion did not provide much breeding ground for na-
tivism. By the late 1870s, however, the gradual decrease in the employment
rate and in the supply of available land once again focused attention on
foreigners—this time the Chinese. The two major complaints against the
Chinese were that they were “by nature, disposition and habits incapable of
assimilating with” American laws and customs and that they came as con-
tract laborers, thereby decreasing the opportunities available to American
workers. Another prominent argument in anti-Chinese agitation was that
Chinese women were being imported to work as prostitutes.21
The vast majority of Chinese immigrants resided on the West Coast,
mainly in California, and the exclusion movement was originally strongest
among the white workers of that region who saw the Chinese as unfair
competition (Chinese contract labor was often used as a device to undermine
union power and to break strikes).22 The workers received support from
Southern congressmen, who, while not usually favorably disposed toward
unions, were willing to support exclusion because of racial considerations.
Moreover, some Californian capitalists, faced with competition from Chinese
manufacturing firms, were themselves becoming favorably disposed toward
exclusion.23 As a result, the Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act
of 1882, which barred Chinese laborers for ten years and made the Chinese
explicitly ineligible for citizenship (the Act was later extended indefinitely
and amended to include all Chinese persons).24
Chinese exclusion, and the later anti-Japanese agitation, often appear as
21Hutchinson, Legislative, p. 68; Takaki, Strangers; Cox, Anti-Asiatic Movement .
22Rudolph, Chinamen.
23Cox, Anti-Asiatic Movement ; Berthoff, Southern Attitudes; Rudolph, Chinamen.
24Hutchinson, Legislative.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 19
side notes or separate entities in general nativist thought, because the ques-
tion of race was so prominent in opposition to Asian immigrants. However,
while contemporaries certainly differentiated between Asian and European
immigrants, the underpinnings of the exclusion debate were surprisingly sim-
ilar to the later discussions on restricting European immigration. Concerns
over assimilability, which were to be so prominent in regard to Southern and
Eastern Europeans from 1890s onward, were also significant in the debate
over Chinese immigrants (although the emphasis on race was much stronger
in relation to the Chinese). Moreover, the Chinese debate also exhibited
another common feature of nativism: the exaggeration of a “foreign threat”
to suppress domestic conflicts: in 1880, the Chinese constituted .002 percent
of the U.S. population, which makes the prominence of the agitation as well
as the drastic legislation it achieved seem rather out of proportion. The
fundamental issues went deeper than the presence of Chinese; according to
Takaki, Chinese exclusion represented an attempt to “defuse an issue agi-
tating white workers” and alleviate the “larger conflict between white labor
and white capital.”25
By the 1880s, then, the major elements of nativist thought—fear of foreign
influence, anti-radicalism, and racism—were fairly well established in the
public mind, and the arguments used by 19th-century nativists (e.g. that the
quality of immigrants had deteriorated) were to be replayed again and again.
However, widespread sentiment in favor of general immigration restriction
was not evident during this period, and the regulative actions taken by
the federal government concerned specific classes of “undesirables,” such
as paupers and criminals, or were directed at ensuring the welfare of the
25Takaki, Strangers, pp. 110-111.
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immigrant.26 Perhaps foreshadowing the later significance that race, as well
as the use of racial friction to control labor, would acquire in immigration
law, the major exception to the individual selection principle was the Chinese
Exclusion Law.
2.3 The Rise of Restrictionism
From the mid-1880s to the late 1890s, the United States was faced with
severe bouts of depression and accompanying episodes of industrial unrest.27
Once again, this uncertain atmosphere not only fed nativist fears, but also
made them more appealing to the general public. The economic distress
of this period coincided with other factors, such as the growth of cities
(and their slum districts) and a change in the sources of immigration, which
further exacerbated xenophobic tendencies.
Anti-foreign sentiment in the 1890s made use of familiar arguments,
once more seeking explanations for the nation’s problems in alien influence.
Catholics again came under attack, and the membership of the American
Protective Association (APA), a popular anti-Catholic group, rose to its
height in 1893–1894.28 There were, however, new elements in the debate as
well: unlike their earlier counterparts, the nativists in this era were begin-
ning to voice intensive demands for actual restriction of the total immigra-
tion. By 1895, over 100 nativist journals were being published in cities from
Washington D.C. to Minneapolis to San Francisco; these journals accused
26Hutchinson, Legislative.
27See e.g. Higham, Strangers. It should perhaps be noted that the industrial unrest of
this period was not simply a question of wages, hours, etc., but involved, if not always di-
rectly, fundamental questions about the roles of workers and owners in a business. Unions
were growing, even if the percentage of organized workers was not high; moreover the view
that wage labor as a permanent condition (as opposed to artisanry or farming) was not
worthy of a self-respecting man had not yet died out—making the question of industrial
relations a complicated and explosive one; see e.g. Dubofsky, State and Labor .
28Daniels, Coming , p. 275.
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the immigrant of taking jobs from Americans, bowing to Rome, and dis-
rupting the life of the nation in general by his immoral and drunken ways.
The spread of this “immigration disease,” the journals said, could only be
stopped by stopping immigration.29
As indicated by the geographical spread of these journals, by this time
even the traditionally immigrant-hungry regions of the South and the West
were beginning to reconsider their stand on restriction. Chinese exclusion
had not ended the employment problems in the West, and European foreign-
ers, too, began to seem threatening. In the South, there had long existed
two opposing views on immigrants: while the industrialists and plantation-
owners wished to encourage immigration, the popular attitude toward out-
siders was consistently one of suspicion. On the other hand, even those who
recruited immigrants for business reasons were by no means immune to prej-
udice against them. In the economically arduous 1890s, suspicion gained the
upper hand, and by 1896 the majority of Southern congressmen had begun
to favor restriction.30
Adding to the economic anguish was concern over changes in the Ameri-
can landscape, especially over the growth—both in size and in influence—of
cities. Urbanization had long seemed an ominous and sinister process to
Americans, and as cities grew, so did the feeling that they would utterly
change, or even ruin, American society. One of the best-known expressions
of such fears is Josiah Strong’s bestselling Our Country, which warned that
the city was “multiplying and focalizing the elements of anarchy and de-
struction.”31 Strong’s fears were shared by many, and by the 1890s there
was a keen sense that the “better elements” should take up the challenge
29Streitmatter, Nativist Press.
30Berthoff, Southern Attitudes; Higham, Strangers, p. 74.
31Quoted in Boyer, Urban Masses, p. 131.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 22
and act in concert to avert the looming disaster.32
The proposed strategies of urban reform varied from the City Beautiful
movement to programs of moral policing. Most relevant for immigration
restriction, however, were the ideas of civic duty gaining currency among
the Boston Brahmin, who were increasingly aware that the immigrant pop-
ulation of their city had come to outnumber the native-born population by
a wide margin.33 Moreover, the immigrants themselves weren’t the same as
earlier; the proportion of Southern and Eastern Europeans was rapidly ex-
ceeding that of Northern and Western Europeans. These “new immigrants”
were seen as less assimilable than the “old” immigrants, and combined with
the already existing urban squalor they provoked fears that Old World’s
rigid social divisions would be recreated in America.
2.3.1 “Wild Motley Throng”: The New Immigrants and the
Growth of Race-Thinking
The origins of the racial theories regarding Europeans lay in what Higham
calls the Anglo-Saxon nativist tradition, which held that Europeans of En-
glish or generally North European origin were the group that embodied the
best of the white race. This tradition was originally both vague and opti-
mistic, and emphasized the capacity of the Anglo-Saxons to assimilate other
races as one of their greatest strengths. In the late 19th century, however,
this confident outlook began to change.
In Ancestors and Immigrants, historian Barbara Solomon examines the
development of anti-immigrant sentiment among patrician New Englanders,
and argues that the intellectual basis of the immigration restriction move-
ment can be found in the civic consciousness that developed among upper-
32Boyer, Urban Masses, pp. 175-179; see also Solomon, Ancestors; Higham, Strangers.
33Solomon, Ancestors.
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class Bostonians in the 1880s. This civic consciousness was part of the
general interest in urban reform among the middle and upper classes, and
sprang from the distaste engendered by municipal corruption and the per-
ception that the educated class, instead of functioning as an example for
others, was relinquishing the political field to ignorant laborers and foreign-
ers.34 Several clubs were founded to bring the “better element” back to
community affairs, and the education of the younger generation became “a
watchword in the cause of good citizenship.”35
One of the main havens of this new education that emphasized the pub-
lic responsibilities of the upper classes was Harvard College, where several
members of the faculty focused on instilling a sense of civic duty in their
students. As one of the motives behind the emphasis on the political engage-
ment of the upper classes was the perpetuation of the “ancestral,” Anglo-
Saxon tradition, immigration was an important question to consider. Many
of the clubs founded in the 1880s dealt with the problem of immigration
(some, like the Massachusetts Society for Promoting Good Citizenship, had
also engaged in immigrant education) while history and English discussion
classes at Harvard also took up the issue. Solomon notes that while most
such classes represented the foreign-born as a societal blight, throughout the
1880s they still displayed a fundamental faith in the powers of assimilation.
The restrictionist case did, however, gradually receive more attention.36
The actual restrictionist impulse arose in the younger generation—the
students who attended these classes. Their parents and professors had al-
ways seen immigration as the foundation of economic prosperity, and so had
34Solomon notes that “the withdrawal of the upper class from political affairs was so
noticeable that Henry Cabot Lodge’s entrance into the political arena in 1882 evoked
public praise.” Solomon, Ancestors, pp. 83-84.
35Solomon, Ancestors, p. 89.
36Solomon, Ancestors.
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Table 2.1: Immigrants by Region of Last Residence, 1820-1920 (percentages)
(Daniels, Coming , p. 122)
1820–60 1861–1900 1900–20
Northwestern Europe 95 68 41
Southeastern Europe — 22 44
North America 3 7 6
Asia — 2 4
Latin America — — 4
Other 2 1 1
been reluctant to support strict restrictions regardless of their personal dis-
taste toward the immigrant. The students, however, were less convinced of
the material necessity of immigration, and closing the gates seemed to them
the natural way to protect America from the problems associated with im-
migrants. As the economic hard times of the 1890s brought the problem
of immigration to the forefront once more, three Harvard graduates of the
class of 1889 “resolved to save the nation by preventing any further inroads
upon Anglo-Saxon America by strangers.” To accomplish this, in 1894 they
organized the Immigration Restriction League, which rapidly became active
in immigration policy, and remained so until the passing of the quota laws.37
As some observers had already noted, the sources of immigration were
changing. This change had begun around the early 1880s, and became dra-
matic in the early 20th century: while most of the immigrants had tradition-
ally come from Northern and Western Europe, by the turn of the century
the numbers of Southern and Eastern Europeans were surpassing the old
immigration (see table 2.1).
Many Americans considered Southern and Eastern Europeans inferior to
37Solomon, Ancestors, p. 102. It should, of course, be noted that anti-immigrant sen-
timent was by no means the consensus at Harvard; in fact, only a handful of students
joined the Immigration Restriction League. However, as the few that joined were both
zealous and influential, in time the League became a formidable force in politics. Solomon,
Ancestors; Higham, Strangers.
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Anglo-Saxons, and as their numbers increased, doubts arose about the func-
tioning of the assimilative process. Though immigrants had traditionally
been considered a necessary labor addition to a growing economy, new theo-
ries proposed that immigration had in fact not meant a population increase
but a population replacement—in other words, had foreign immigration not
existed, the native population would have procreated more. For evidence,
the theories pointed to the decline in the native birth rate, especially in
regions where large numbers of immigrants lived. Social scientist claimed
that the new immigration, in particular, bore responsibility for this drop in
birth rate: because the newcomers had “a poorer standard of living” and
“habits repellent to our native people,” Americans were discouraged from
reproducing, as their children would have to compete “with those whom
they did not recognize as their own grade and station.”38
In the 1890s, however, relatively few people were concerned about the
change in the immigrant stream. According to Higham, “[t]he rising flood of
popular xenophobia drew much more upon conventional anti-foreign ideas”
and fears of Anglo-Saxon demise were still largely confined to patrician cir-
cles. In the opening years of the twentieth century, the public found these
fears even less relevant, as imperialism once more boosted the faith in as-
similation.39
However, the happily imperialistic mood did not long survive the com-
plications of expansion. At the same time, the patrician race-thinkers were
finding new sources of scientific support for their fears. Especially important
was the eugenics movement, launched in Britain by the Darwinian scientist
Sir Francis Galton. Galton drew upon the work of Gregor Mendel on inheri-
38Francis A. Walker, 1899, quoted in Hawes, Social Scientists, p. 470; see also Ludmerer,
Genetics; Fairchild, Paradox .
39Higham, Strangers, pp. 139,144-145.
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tance of traits as well as on August Weismann’s theory of germinal continuity
to support his own research on heredity, and started “an active propaganda”
to promote his conviction that “the betterment of society depends largely on
improvement of the ‘inborn qualities’ of ‘the human breed.’” This, of course,
was of obvious interest to nativists in the United States, since it stipulated
that if the country were to admit lower “raw material,” its institutions and
its very nature would inevitably degenerate. The upper-class Bostonians—
the founders of the Immigration Restriction League—found the message of
eugenics alluring, in particular: besides appealing to their sense of inherent
superiority, it also provided fresh arguments against immigration.40
Racial attitudes were, then, becoming increasingly significant in relation
to European immigrants. American social science soon began to incorpo-
rate the new hereditary theories in its research, and the eugenics movement
became established in the U.S. as well as in Europe. “Preserving the Amer-
ican race” became a new and important slogan for restrictionists, and the
method of restriction they recommended—the literacy test—was ideolog-
ically well adapted to address their two major concerns, the racial purity
and intellectual composition of America. Verifying that the immigrant could
read provided at least some guarantee of his mental powers, and as statis-
tics indicated Southern and Eastern Europeans to have fairly low literacy
rates, the test would effectively enforce the Anglo-Saxon preference of the
restrictionists.41
The idea of a literacy test was first introduced in a series of lectures
by the economist Edward Bemis in 1887, and in 1891 the Bostonian Con-
gressman Henry Cabot Lodge took up the proposal and began to press for
legislation that would ascertain the literacy of all immigrants before they
40Higham, Strangers, pp. 150,152.
41See e.g. Hutchinson, Legislative, pp. 465-467.
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were admitted. He was assisted in this effort by the Immigration Restric-
tion League, which mounted a nationwide campaign to foster support for
the test.42 With varying degrees of success, the literacy requirement was
included as a provision in one bill after another, usually with Lodge as its
leading advocate. A bill containing the provision passed for the first time
in the 54th Congress (1895-1897) but was vetoed by President Cleveland.
The House overrode the veto but the Senate took no action. In subsequent
Congresses, the test provision was reintroduced several times, but did not
make much headway in the fairly confident atmosphere of the new century;
in the bill that became the 1907 Act, the literacy provision was struck out in
favor of an amendment that created a commission to research the question of
immigration.43 This commission (usually called the Dillingham Commission
after its chairman, Senator William P. Dillingham) produced a 42-volume re-
port in 1911; its recommendations included the enactment of a literacy test.
After a number of failed or vetoed attempts, the literacy test was finally
introduced with the Immigration Act of 1917 over President Wilson’s veto.
The test excluded “all aliens over sixteen years of age, physically capable of
reading, who can not read the English language, or some other language or
dialect, including Hebrew or Yiddish.”44
The long history of the literacy test, and the numerous failed attempts
to make it law, indicate the relative unconcern of most Americans in regard
42Higham, Strangers.
43Hutchinson, Legislative; Higham, Strangers; Hall, Recent History .
44Quoted in Hutchinson, Legislative, p. 467. Exempted from the test were some elderly
male relatives, as well as close female relatives, of resident aliens or citizens, refugees from
religious persecution, returning resident aliens of five years’ continuous residence who had
been absent less than six months, and aliens in transit.
However, Anglo-Saxon hopes were not fulfilled as completely as they might have been
had the test been instituted in the 1890s: the literacy test provision of the 1917 Act
was much more lenient than the original reading and writing test, occasionally with spe-
cific language requirements, that had been the reigning proposal in the 1890s; moreover,
literacy rates among Southern and Eastern Europeans had increased in the interval.
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to immigration in the prewar years. According to Higham, although anxi-
ety “crept about the fringes of American thought” at its heart was still “a
supreme confidence.”45 This was, after all, the Progressive Era, a time char-
acterized by confidence in the power of reform to bring about a continually
improving society, and most Americans were not yet willing to believe that
Europeans could be inherently unassimilable. Interestingly enough, this pe-
riod of confidence coincided with the high point of new immigration, lending
credence to the argument that the domestic situation was generally more
important in sparking anti-immigrant sentiment than was the character or
behavior of immigrants. It also suggests that the racist attitude toward
Southern and Eastern Europeans, often cited as a major cause of immi-
gration restriction in the twenties, did not originate in the general public
(though prejudice was certainly common and the general public probably
was ready enough to be influenced by racist theories and propaganda). On
the other hand, the fact that Congress did repeatedly propose and pass such
a restrictive test also implies a fair degree of continuity in anti-immigrant
sentiment.46
It should be noted that, although eugenics and race-thinking were gain-
ing credence, social scientists were far from unanimous regarding the unas-
similability of the new immigrants: even as the eugenist viewpoint was gain-
ing acceptance, there were scientists (most notably the anthropologist Franz
Boas) who conducted research that indicated the importance of environmen-
tal factors in the formation of an individual.47 Moreover, even though the
thrust of the restrictionist movement during this period came from the patri-
45Higham, Strangers, p. 148.
46Between 1897 and 1915, four bills containing the literacy provision passed the Congress
but were vetoed by the president; the test was also included in many more proposed bills
that did not advance or were not passed. See Hutchinson, Legislative, pp. 465–468.
47Hawes, Social Scientists; Ludmerer, Genetics.
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cian circles, there is no reason to assume that the the confident atmosphere
reflected only in the attitudes of the “masses”: the same fluctuation between
faith in the immigrants’ assimilation and fear of their foreignness existed in
the patrician circles as well.48
2.3.2 Americanization and Anti-Radicalism
As Solomon has shown, New England elites were significant in creating an
intellectual and theoretical background for suspicion and fear of the immi-
grant. By themselves, however, they probably could not have accomplished
much: as Calavita argues, if racist nativism had “been confined to these mut-
terings of a bitter elite from a passing era, it would probably have amounted
to little more than an historical curiosity.”49 But this was not the case: as
discussed above, the elites received important support from the new theories
of eugenics. In addition, a third factor, the utility of race-thinking to leading
capitalists, was crucial in bringing about the influence that anti-immigrant
sentiment was to wield.
Since at least the 1880s, capitalists had explained labor unrest and class
cleavages by claiming that they were a product not of real injustice and
dissatisfaction but of the arrival of masses of foreigners who had brought
with them the social patterns of their old countries and had not adopted
American ideals. The immigrant provided a useful scapegoat for social ills:
if industrial conflict was not the result of prevailing conditions but of the
class prejudices that the immigrant had brought with him, then there was
no reason to change the way business operated.50
The “immigrant as villain”–model was not only valuable in vitiating the
48For an interesting study of one such case, see Szuberla, Henry Blake Fuller .
49Calavita, U.S. Immigration Law , p. 105.
50Calavita, U.S. Immigration Law ; Barrett, Americanization; Heald, Business Atti-
tudes.
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grievances of immigrant workers: it was also extremely useful in checking the
demands of native laborers. Once the perception of the immigrant as men-
tally inferior and subversive was firmly established in the public mind, dis-
sent became effectively equated with disloyalty and un-Americanism. This
meant that the dissatisfaction expressed by American workers could be de-
clared the result of misleading and malicious propaganda disseminated by
alien radicals.51
An important avenue for establishing the equation “alien=radical” was
the Americanization movement. As the numbers of arriving immigrants
grew in the early 20th century, several charitable organizations (most no-
tably the YMCA and the settlement houses) attempted to alleviate the living
conditions of the new arrivals and to facilitate their adjustment into Amer-
ican society. But the welfare of the immigrant was not their only concern.
Assimilation was important for the society as well. The smooth functioning
of factories required that workers knew enough English and were familiar
enough with American customs to carry out their tasks; politically, too, a
large mass of foreigners might prove dangerous for the cohesion and stability
of the country.
From early on, immigrant education had a strong business component.
The first of the active Americanization groups, the North American Civic
League for Immigrants (NACLI), was created as a result of a conference
sponsored by the YMCA, and was composed of the “more conservative eco-
nomic interests,” appointing as its president W. Chauncey Brewer, later to
become the executive head of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, and as its
vice-president Bernard J. Rothwell, industrialist and president of the Boston
Chamber of Commerce. In 1909, a New York (later New York–New Jersey)
51Calavita, U.S. Immigration Law ; Carey, Taking .
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Committee of the NACLI was established; it was composed almost exclu-
sively of corporate executives. Among its other activities, this committee
organized a number of conferences of industrialists that emphasized the role
of immigrant education as both a tool for preventing social unrest and an
aid in making the immigrant more valuable economically.52
The Americanization movement intensified in 1912, when the Industrial
Workers of the World, one of the more radical labor unions, helped orga-
nize and win a strike involving mostly foreign workers at a Lawrence, Mas-
sachusetts textile mill. The success of the strike was in large degree due to
the negative publicity aroused by the violent tactics of the management and
the police, which made business leaders determined to repair their tarnished
public image. The NACLI, then, “moved quickly to counter the success of
the strike” and promptly held a joint conference about immigration with
the Boston Chamber of Commerce.53 The NACLI argued that “the indus-
trial future of the country depended largely upon the education of the adult
alien workers”54 and campaigned to enlist the various chambers of commerce
in the effort to Americanize the immigrant. Two years later, the NY–NJ
Committee changed its name to the Committee for Immigrants in America,
reflecting its decision to enlarge the scope of the program to cover the entire
nation. To accomplish this, it sought the cooperation of the Federal Bureau
of Education; when the Bureau objected that it had no available funds, the
Committee decided to provide both the financing and the staff, and a special
Division of Immigrant Education was created within the Bureau of Educa-
tion, lending authority and legitimacy to the Americanization campaign of
the Committee.55
52Carey, Taking , pp. 40-41; Hartmann, Movement .
53Carey, Taking , p. 43.
54Carey, Taking , p. 44.
55Carey, Taking ; Hartmann, Movement .
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In addition to the corporate nature of the Americanization associations,
many individual businesses also conducted their own Americanization pro-
grams. The most ambitious (and probably the most famous) of these was the
one at Ford’s Highland Park Model T plant. Ford’s Americanization plan
was part of the Five Dollar Day program, which “combined assembly-line
technology with a shorter work day, incentive pay, and an elaborate person-
nel management system.”56 To teach “American ways” to the immigrants,
Ford established a Sociology Department, whose case workers focused not
only on the work habits of the immigrants but also on their domestic lives,
stressing the importance of a middle-class environment and values. Eligi-
bility for incentive pay depended on the immigrant’s ability to demonstrate
his possession of both the necessary trade skills and the required lifestyle.57
Other companies, too, joined in the Americanization fever. As in the case
of the Ford plan, businesses commonly combined Americanization programs
with welfare capitalism and/or scientific management in a general effort to
increase the productivity and loyalty of the workforce. This was in part
a response to the reduced labor supply as immigration waned during the
war, and in part an effort to counter the growing participation of immigrant
workers in unions.58
The patriotic wartime atmosphere was favorable to the Americanizers,
and gradually the Americanization project became integrated with the gen-
eral preparedness movement. Local associations promoting and conducting
Americanization classes multiplied, as did industrial Americanization plans
56Barrett, Americanization, p. 1003.
57Barrett, Americanization; Higham, Strangers.
58James Barrett has discussed extensively the socialization of immigrants through con-
tact with native workers, i.e., worker- rather than employer-led Americanization. He notes
that during the war, unions—especially the more radical ones—were fairly successful in
organizing immigrant workers, which made employers apprehensive of a class-conscious
workforce. Barrett, Americanization.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 33
(by 1919, at least 800 industrial plants had Americanization activity). De-
spite the variety of these programs, they usually cooperated with national
organizations, and the increasing centralization of the national campaign
strove to ensure the consistency of the Americanization message through
dissemination of standard course materials and course outlines.59
Once the war was over, the checks it had placed on industrial discord
lifted, and “both capital and labor kicked loose like young colts.”60 The
regular union demands were supplemented by more radical movements, re-
bounding from the wartime restrictions and drawing new strength from the
Russian Revolution. The industrialists, on the other hand, were adamant
to undo the gains that labor had made in both membership and relations
with the government, as well as to solidify their own newly improved pub-
lic image and political power. The campaign to label all labor agitation
as un-American, begun in 1912, was thus brought back on track. A case
in point was the business reaction to the Great Steel Strike of 1919, which
involved 350,000 workers dissatisfied with their 84-hour week and work con-
ditions. The course the Steel Corporation adopted was not to negotiate
with the strikers but to focus on turning public opinion against them by
labeling the strike un-American and its leaders proponents of Bolshevism
and anarchism. When the strike began, public opinion largely favored the
strikers. The Steel Corporation’s massive advertisement campaign, urging
the strikers to go back to work and emphasizing Americanism, eventually
succeeded in its objective: the public turned against the strikers and the
59Carey, Taking . While the national organization was very heavily business-oriented
and probably tried its best to keep the various local efforts in its control, it should nev-
ertheless be noted that both the style and the motives of Americanizers varied greatly,
and the movement never became ideologically cohesive. See e.g. Bogardus, Essentials and
Aronovici, Americanization for different takes on Americanization.
60Higham, Strangers, p.255.
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strike ended without the workers having gained a single concession.61
The Great Steel Strike was only one episode in the hysteria that shook
America in the postwar years. For almost two years, the nation was awash
with ever-growing estimates of the number of Communists in the country,
and the press was filled with reports of subversive activity and anarchist
plots. The intense demand for loyalty during the war, defined not only as
support for the U.S. rather than some other country in the war effort, but
also as total conformity to the “American way,” whatever the state (or the
business community) defined it to mean, had provided a fertile breeding
ground for suspicion and intolerance. Thus, it was probably no hard task to
induce the average citizen to believe in the imminent danger of revolution,
and congressmen could seriously announce that “there is real danger that
the government will fall.”62
Business propaganda cannot, of course, be blamed for all the intensity
and actions of the Red Scare—obviously, the issue is more complex. This
is evinced by the number of varying interpretations regarding the causes of
the hysteria, as well as by the number of popular, apparently spontaneous
attacks by private citizens on “subversives” (an extremely broad category
at the time).63 The state, too, was heavily involved; after all, possibly the
most famous feature of the Red Scare is Attorney General Mitchell Palmer’s
crusade against alien workers and members of the Industrial Workers of the
World, and the massive deportations these raids led to.
61Carey, Taking . For a detailed account of the Great Steel Strike and the role that fears
of Bolshevism played in defeating it, see Murray, Communism.
62Senator Miles Poindexter, quoted in Murray, Communism, p. 462.
63See e.g. Coben, Study in Nativism. Coben lists a number of extreme incidents of
intolerance: for example, in 1919, a sailor fired three shots into the back of a man who
had refused to rise for the playing of “The Star-Spangled Banner” at a victory loan
pageant—and the crowd cheered; similarly, a clothing store salesman was sentenced to six
months in jail for having commented to a customer that Lenin was “the brainiest” or “one
of the brainiest” of the world’s political leaders.
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It should also be noted that the fears that the business leaders espoused
of the radicalism of workers were not entirely unfounded. Labor had made
gains during the war, the expectations of many workers were relatively high,
and many more than before were inclined to accept radical ideas such as
worker or national control of certain industries (the railroads and mines, for
example).64 Moreover, the postwar years witnessed growth in radicalism, as
well as a number of violent strikes and even bomb explosions. Nevertheless,
the picture of imminent doom that prevailed in the press during the Red
Scare was without question hugely exaggerated.65
The role of industry in fostering exaggerated media coverage of incipient
Bolshevism in America was a significant one. In addition to political adver-
tisements in the newspapers, the indirect influence of the business commu-
nity was important in the tone of reporting: mass-circulation dailies were
increasingly under corporate (rather than entrepreneurial) ownership, the
number of newspaper chains was rising, and advertising accounted for over
60 percent of all newspaper revenue. Moreover, as the importance of adver-
tising grew, newspapers increasingly sought not simply the largest possible
circulation but also an audience with more buying power, steering coverage
toward further compliance with middle-class and business views.66
The equation of immigrants (especially new immigrants) with labor agi-
tation and worker’s demands with un-American subversion was largely ac-
complished by the early years of the 1920s. Of course, the major concern
of business in encouraging the association of radicalism with immigrants
had not been to vilify the immigrant but to ensure a cooperative labor
force, a project which was in large measure successful: throughout the twen-
64Calavita, U.S. Immigration Law , pp. 116-117.
65Carey, Taking ; Murray, Communism.
66Abramowitz, Press, pp.62–65.
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ties, union membership declined and unions remained conciliatory and sub-
dued.67 The impact of the equation on the immigrants, however, was quite
as immense: various restrictionists had, after all, for decades been saying
that the flood of undesirables was going to push the whole country to the
brink of revolution—now, here was the proof. Bolshevism, the main bogey
of the day, was unavoidably equated with Eastern European immigrants,
and the general public had not missed the foreign component of radical or-
ganizations. In the wake of the red-baiting hysteria, Americanization of any
kind no longer seemed sufficient to combat the evil influence that the im-
migrant was presumed to have on American society. Restriction, therefore,
became the word of the day.
67Bernstein, The Growth of American Unions.
Chapter 3
Arguing Restriction in
Congress
3.1 The Quota Acts
After the war and its immediate aftermath, when the transportation lines
again became fully operative, an increasing number of voices were once more
raised in warning: Europe, war-weary and in ruins, was going to send over
her beaten rabble to America. A number of bills were introduced in Congress
calling for various measures against immigrants, including the suspension of
immigration for a period ranging from two years to unspecified length.1
However, the voices of doom were drowned in the general confusion and
hysteria of the Red Scare; to some extent, they were also discredited by the
failure of the flood of beaten rabble to materialize, and the suspension bills
all died in Congress.2 But in mid-1920, when the Red Scare had abated and
1Hutchinson, Legislative, pp. 169–171.
2Congress did, however, enact a number of other laws on immigration in 1918–1920,
regarding e.g. the deportation of alien enemies and passport controls. In addition, bills
on diverse issues relating to immigrants (Americanization, barring immigrants from civil
service, deportation of undesirables etc.) were introduced, though not acted upon. See
Hutchinson, Legislative for details. Hutchinson also provides a detailed discussion of the
37
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the numbers of immigrants began to reach prewar levels, the immigration
question again gained prominence both in the press and in Congressional
discussions.
Congress had, of course, enacted the long-fought-for literacy test in the
1917 Act. This test had laid the groundwork for the 1920s debate inasmuch
as it had embraced the idea of restrictive, instead of merely selective, im-
migration policy.3 It also added new clauses regarding alien radicals and
provided the Department of Labor with the power of deporting them, re-
flecting the growing fear of socialism and anarchism.4 However, the clauses
prohibiting radicals excluded fairly few immigrants, and during its long path
in Congress the literacy test had become much less stringent than the read-
ing and writing test envisioned by its original proponents in the 1890s. The
test, and the law in general, proved “a fairly coarse sieve.”5 In late 1920,
therefore, a suspension bill was again introduced in Congress, this time soft-
ened by exempting close relatives of residents; the urgency of the matter
was emphasized in the bill’s name, “A Bill to Provide for the Protection of
the Citizens of the United States by the Temporary Suspension of Immigra-
tion.”6 After the period of suspension was cut down to fourteen months,
the bill passed the House with a vote of 296 to 42; all but one of the op-
posing votes came from the industrial areas between Chicago and Boston,
showing the completeness of the attitude-spin that the South and the West
had undergone.7 The Senate, however, was more sensitive to both business
provisions included in both the 1921 and 1924 Acts and outlines their careers in Congress.
3While the 1917 Act did not directly limit the number of entrants (and apparently
was also unsuccessful in significantly diminishing immigration), its literacy test provision
applied to such a large group that it was, in the minds of many, in effect a restrictive
policy. See e.g. Fairchild, Literacy Test ; Frank, From Nativism to the Quota Laws.
4Higham, Strangers, p. 221.
5Higham, Strangers, p. 308.
6Similarly, the Senate hearings on the bill were held under the rubric “Emergency
Immigration Legislation.” Senate, Hearings on H.R. 14461 .
7Higham, Strangers.
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and immigrant demands, although many senators agreed with the House
that at least the new immigration ought to be cut back. Senator Dilling-
ham, therefore, introduced the quota plan: this would give each European
nationality a quota that was to equal 5 percent of the number of foreign-
born persons of that nationality residing in the United States at the time
of the 1910 census.8 Unlike the suspension measure, the Dillingham bill
was only concerned with European immigration; immigration from the New
World would remain without numerical limitations, and immigration from
Asia would continue to be governed by earlier legislation.
The senators amended the percentage from 5 to 3 and then passed the
bill easily, after which the House rejected its own suspension plan in favor
of the Senate version. President Wilson, receiving the bill during his last
days in office, vetoed it; however, it was promptly reintroduced in a special
session of Congress, cleared both houses speedily, and received President
Harding’s signature in May, 1921.9
In 1922, the quota law was extended for two years, after only brief debate
in the House and slightly broader discussion in the Senate. During this
extension period, immigration remained a pertinent issue: several bills were
introduced in Congress to either relax or tighten immigration policy, and
the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization continued to hold
hearings on the subject. However, the next significant step wasn’t taken
until 1924, when the House Committee reported a bill to replace the expiring
temporary quota act. The new draft provided for consular inspection abroad
8Higham, Strangers. The 1920 census had not yet been completed; it should, however,
be noted that in the debate some members insisted that the bill should be rewritten to
use the 1920 census as soon as it was completed, the decision to use the 1910 census
was, according to these representatives, intentionally discriminative as it would reduce
the numbers of Southern and Eastern European immigrants more than a bill based on the
1920 census. See e.g. Congr. Rec., vol. 60, p. 3968; vol. 61, pp. 505, 556–559.
9Higham, Strangers.
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to avoid having to ship back prospective immigrants who came after their
nationality quota was filled; moreover, it substituted the census of 1910 for
that of 1890 and reduced the percentage from 3 to 2. It also instituted the
exclusion of Japanese immigrants.10
The final form of the quota law, despite heated debate on the House and
Senate floors, closely agreed with the proposal put forth by the Committee.
It instituted the provision for consular inspection abroad and regulated ex-
tensively the specifics of visa applications. It didn’t affect immigration from
the Western Hemisphere; for Europeans, it fixed the nationality quota at
2 percent of the 1890 census (though all nationalities were to have a mini-
mum quota of 100). The law further provided that after 1927, the maximum
number of European immigrants would be 150,000; this was to be divided so
that each nationality quota “shall be a number which bears the same ratio
to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in the continental United States
in 1920 having that national origin.”11 It further excluded all “aliens in-
eligible to citizenship”—this referred to the Japanese, as Asians were the
only group ineligible to citizenship and the Japanese were the only Asians
whom no law yet prevented from immigrating.12 Exempted from both quo-
tas and exclusion were non-immigrant groups such as government officials,
10Hutchinson, Legislative, pp. 182–183. In fact, a draft with the same quota provisions
but without Japanese exclusion had been reported in early 1923; however, the circum-
stances were far from favorable at that time—the depression had lifted and business inter-
ests were clamoring for more labor, while farmers were unhappy about their hired hands
moving to the cities—and so the matter was deferred. Hutchinson, Legislative; Higham,
Strangers.
11Immigration Act of 1924 , p. 159. This was to be decided on the basis of immigration
statistics and statistics on increase of population. The national origins provision was later
the subject of much contention and its institution was delayed until 1929. However, the
quotas it resulted in were much the same as those calculated on the basis of the foreign-
born present during the 1890 census, although the English received a rather larger share
under the national origins system.
12Immigration Act of 1924 , p. 162. Chinese were excluded with a specific act in 1882,
and the 1917 Act had created an “Asiatic Barred Zone” preventing the entry of all other
Asians.
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travelers in transit, tourists, and temporarily entering seamen. Moreover,
the quotas did not apply to students, professors, ministers of any religious
denomination, or the wives and unmarried children under 18 years of age
of resident citizens. The Act also specified preferences within the quotas;
these preferences went to close relatives, immigrants “skilled in agriculture”
and their wives and dependent children.13
Both the permanent Immigration Act of 1924 as well as the earlier tem-
porary version preserved previous immigration laws; in other words, all im-
migrants would have to be eligible not only under the quota law but also
under earlier legislation. The provisions regarding alien radicals and the lit-
eracy of immigrants therefore remained in effect, as did the Asian exclusion
laws.14
3.2 Arguing Restriction
The debate on immigration restriction in the first half of the 1920s turned
mainly on three questions: the economic impact of immigration, the danger
posed by foreign, radical ideas, and the racial character of the immigrants.
Which of these was emphasized varied depending on the speaker; the em-
phasis also shifted over time. In most arguments for restriction, however,
all three aspects were intertwined.
Underlying all of the various strains of argumentation was the fear that
massive immigration would cause social problems and general instability
that would fundamentally alter American society. Phrases such as “alien
indigestion,” “foreign invaders,” “flood tide of Bolshevists,” and “the scum
of Europe,” appear and reappear in the Congressional debate. Such rhetoric
13Immigration Act of 1924 , pp. 155–156.
14The 1917 Act applied to all immigrants, not only Europeans. See An Act to Regulate
(1917); An Act to Limit (1921); Immigration Act of 1924 .
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is particularly prominent in the debate over the first, temporary, quota act
in 1921, reflecting both the impact of the Red Scare and the fear of massive
post-war European immigration. Indeed, it is more than likely that the
passage of a permanent, tight immigration policy in the 1920s owed much to
the fact that the first measure was temporary and came under consideration
in the immediate wake of the Red Scare. Opposition, though fairly strong,
was made less effective by the temporary nature of the act, and the anxious
atmosphere made both congressmen and the public yearn for a concrete way
of instituting a “breathing spell.”
In many respects, the fundamental questions regarding immigration law
were resolved in the 1920–1921 debate: by the time the bill was signed, both
the quota principle and the need for drastic limitation of immigration were
solidly established. The law—a hastily designed “emergency measure”—
resulted in chaotic conditions on Ellis Islands as officials wondered what
to do with immigrants who arrived after their country’s quota had been
filled.15 The imperfect operation of the law resulted in added pressure to
draft permanent legislation; it also gave weight to the restrictionists’ plea for
tighter controls and fewer immigrants. In the 1924 debate, the opponents
of restriction initially tried to argue that the problem was not that the law
admitted too many immigrants but that its practical provisions and the way
it was enforced made its operation chaotic. These objections, however, were
quickly drowned in the convoluted quarrel over the quota basis and in the
diplomatic problems regarding Japanese exclusion.
15The 1921 Act stipulated that no country could use more than 20 percent of its yearly
quota in one month; this resulted in immigrant-carrying ships waiting outside the harbor
and then racing each other to arrive right after midnight on the first of the month. Most
Southern and Eastern European countries also used up their yearly quotas in the first five
months, and many immigrants who had embarked in good faith arrived only to find that
they would not be admitted.
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3.2.1 Race: Assimilation and Unassimilables
Racial arguments for immigration restriction fell into two categories: those
used against the Japanese (and other Asians) and those advanced against
Southern and Eastern Europeans. Despite referring to both groups as racial,
most debaters clearly differentiated between them, so that Southern and
Eastern Europeans were clearly considered white (i.e., of the same general
race as the debaters themselves) whereas the Japanese were seen as fun-
damentally different and racially much further removed from the debaters
(who were, of course, the reference group as representative of what they
termed the “American race.”).
This split shows the elusiveness of the concept of race at the time (and
perhaps more generally as well). “Race” was occasionally used as a sci-
entific term, at other times as denoting a popularly acknowledged though
not exactly defined category, and still at other times as something more or
less synonymous with “national character.” In their speeches, congressmen
rarely attempted to define what they meant by the term; rather, they appar-
ently assumed that there was enough of a consensus on the matter among
their listeners to avoid confusion. However, while the racial otherness of
the Japanese was treated as a given, racial differences between Europeans
were argued about at some length, and in the case of Southern and Eastern
Europeans restrictionists considered it necessary to cite various authorities
and elaborate on the importance a homogeneous population.
As indicated by the greater need for specific arguments, the idea of racial
differences between Europeans continued to be controversial. Many mem-
bers of Congress, journalists, and academics bitterly criticized both the idea
and its proponents, asserting that there was no scientific basis for these
claims. No such controversy existed regarding the Japanese. Advocates of
CHAPTER 3. ARGUING RESTRICTION IN CONGRESS 44
Japanese exclusion on the whole felt little need to assert that Japanese were
in any sense inferior: they could be confident that their audience would con-
sider the Japanese a different race and, consequently, would also agree that
their assimilation into American society was both undesirable and impossi-
ble.
Japanese Exclusion
Most of those speaking for exclusion unambiguously stated that in their
opinion, whatever the achievements of the Japanese, the racial gulf was so
wide between them and whites that they could and should not assimilate.
Even those speaking against the specific way in which the law intended to
exclude the Japanese usually launched their oratory by emphasizing how
they fully agreed that exclusionary or at least stringently restrictive mea-
sures ought to be employed against Japanese immigrants.16
Race was also significant in the way in which the exclusion of Japanese
was instituted in the Immigration Act of 1924. The crucial clause read:
No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States
unless such alien (1) is admissible as a non-quota immigrant under the
provisions of subdivision (b), (d), or (e) of section 4, or (2) is the wife,
or the unmarried child under 18 years of age, of an immigrant admis-
sible under such subdivision (d), and is accompanying or following to
join him, or (3) is not an immigrant as defined in section 3.17
While the Japanese weren’t mentioned by name, there was no doubt that
they were the target of the clause, and contemporaries consistently referred
to the law as “Japanese exclusion.”18 The clause built upon the fact that
16For statements by congressmen on the racial difference between Japanese and white
Americans, see e.g. Congr. Rec., vol. 65, pp. 5680, 5927, 6249, 6465, 6614.
17Sec 13c, “Immigration Act of 1924,” p. 162. Section 4 dealt with non-quota immi-
grants; the subdivisions b, d, and e let in e.g. previously admitted immigrants seeking to
return, professors, ministers of religious denominations, and students who came in solely
for the purpose of study. Section 3 defined as “not immigrant” such groups as government
officials and tourists..
18All other Asians, except for Filipinos who were considered American nationals, were
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naturalization was restricted to “white persons and persons of African de-
scent”19 and therefore left the status of Asians unclear.
In her article about the racial definition of American citizenship and
immigration law, Mae M. Ngai discusses at some length the process through
which the Asians’ ineligibility to citizenship was consolidated in the early
20th century, culminating in two cases before the Supreme Court in 1922 and
1923. Both were petitions to citizenship by highly educated, Americanized
immigrants. As the petitioners were Asians, however, the task before the
Court was to evaluate whether, given the “white persons and persons of
African descent” clause, the petitioners were racially eligible. Federal courts
had earlier admitted a number of Syrians, Armenians and Asian Indians to
citizenship on the basis of scientific works that placed some Asians in the
Caucasian or white category. In Ozawa v. United States, the first of the two
cases that were to settle the non-whiteness of Asians, the Supreme Court
avoided this by “asserting that white and Caucasian were one and the same,
concluding, with circular reasoning, that the Japanese cannot be Caucasian
because they are not white.” In the second case, United States vs. Thind,
where the petitioner was an Asian Indian who claimed right to citizenship
on the basis of his Aryan and Caucasian roots, the Court finally resolved the
problem of scientific definition by discarding them in favor of the popular
definition of “Caucasian,” and noting that this was much narrower in scope
and did not include Asians.
The Supreme Court, then, had reinforced the racial definition of Ameri-
already prevented from immigrating by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the “Asiatic
Barred Zone” created by the Immigration Act of 1917.
19“Naturalization Act of 1870,” quoted in Daniels, Coming , p. 245 Originally, natu-
ralization had been restricted to “free white persons,” but was extended to persons of
African descent after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was “a gratuitous
gesture to the former slaves,” states Ngai, citing a federal judge’s explanation that no-
body expected Africans to emigrate, whereas the Asians were obviously doing so. Ngai,
Architecture, p. 81.
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can citizenship and confirmed the popular perception that Asians, regardless
of their achievements, were unsuited to live in the American society.
In the exclusionist argument, too, race was paramount, and the achieve-
ments of the Japanese were irrelevant to the question of their desirability
as immigrants. In fact, they received ample praise: they were described as
hard-working, thrifty, ambitious, and enterprising—all characteristics that
in other contexts were used to describe good American citizens. Yet, the
very people portraying the Japanese in this way were adamant that they
should not be let into the country—indeed, they cited those very qualities
as the reason the Japanese should be kept out. For example, Mr. Wallace
of the American Federation of Labor stated before the House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization that
when the Japs first came as laborers, the American boy left the farm
because it became a Jap’s job. And eventually, what was the result?
Those people that came here to work—agricultural laborers, if you
will—became the owners of the land. [...] Now, people are asking, if
these people are thrifty, why should they not eventually own the land?
And I want to say that I think that the people who cut this country
out of the wilderness have a prior right...20
Similarly, one congressman complained that the Japanese had acquired con-
trol of about one sixth of the richest California lands by 1920, that they were
“rapidly getting control of the fishing business,” saved money in Japanese-
owned banks, owned stores, and attended American schools “and in many
instances are in the majority in attendance.” In the case of Caucasian
immigrants, business success and interest for education were much more
commonly cited in the immigrants’ favor than to their detriment, even if
manifestations of ethnic solidarity (such as immigrant banks) were often
seen as threatening. With the Japanese, however, thrift and industry were
20Wallace, Statement , p. 87.
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sinister traits: any positive images that the Japanese successes might have
created were quickly countered by allusions to the economic threats that
this posed for Americans. For example, the reason this particular congress-
man objected to Japanese store ownership was that in those stores they
purchased “goods made in their own country and brought here by their own
ships” and that because the Japanese controlled the growing of green vegeta-
bles, Americans were being forced out of business, “preference being given
by Japanese to Japanese stores.”21 While Japanese ethnic solidarity prob-
ably was a fact (as it was with practically all immigrant groups, not only
the Japanese) it is more than likely that it was reinforced by the refusals
of white Americans to do business with the Japanese. As Mr. Freeman, a
member of the (Washington) State Veteran’s Welfare Committee, lamented
before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization,
Six or seven years ago the grocers of the city of Seattle [. . . ] tried
to get an agreement by which the white wholesale grocers should not
sell to the Japanese, and they were going to put pressure to bear to
protect themselves, when the United States district attorney notified
them that if they did that they would be subject to prosecution under
the Federal laws, so that they were helpless. . . 22
Though the exclusionists viewed all Japanese businesses with distaste,
they were primarily concerned by the inclination of the Japanese to purchase
land and engage in farming. What makes this concern particularly interest-
ing is that one of the major objections to the “new” European immigrants
was that they tended to settle in urban areas and work in industrial rather
than agrarian occupations, thereby eluding the democratizing and Amer-
icanizing influences of the wholesome farm life. Ronald Takaki notes that
the Japanese had understood the American preference for rural dwellers and
tried to act accordingly, hoping that bringing their families, acquiring land,
21Congr. Rec., vol. 65, p. 5926.
22Freeman, Statement , p. 236.
CHAPTER 3. ARGUING RESTRICTION IN CONGRESS 48
and showing that they intended to settle and become Americans would fa-
cilitate acceptance.23 Instead, Americans responded by accusing them of
driving “white laborers and tenants away from farms”24 and complaining
that
it is impossible for white people to compete with people of that sort
who live in squalid quarters, make their mothers, wives, and children
work in the field, live on such a limited diet that no white man could
exist on it, and work long and unusual hours which would break down
the health of any white man.25
Contemporaries did not comment on the contradiction involved in decry-
ing the Southern and Eastern Europeans for not wanting to till the soil and
the Japanese for doing exactly that. It is therefore difficult to know whether
they perceived any contradiction, and if so, how they explained it. It could
be argued that though the Japanese engaged in farming, their farms were
heavily concentrated in one region, thereby both making them prominent
and decreasing the likelihood of assimilation; however, like ethnic solidarity,
this was not a phenomenon restricted to Japanese immigrants (consider, for
example, the Scandinavians in the Midwest). A far more plausible expla-
nation is that the Japanese were seen as so fundamentally different racially
that their presence itself was distasteful to many, and certainly wasn’t made
more palatable by their success in business or indications that they wished to
stay. Indeed, former Senator James D. Phelan (CA), advocating exclusion,
stated that
The ultimate purpose of the Japanese which we cannot overlook is to
establish themselves in this country on an equality with Europeans and
thus enjoy citizenship, the voting privilege, the ownership of land and
other benefits.26
23Takaki, Strangers, pp. 195-197.
24Mr. McClatchy in NYT, March 12, 1924
25MacLafferty in Congr. Rec., vol. 65, p. 5927.
26NYT, March 14, 1924
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Lawrence Fuchs notes that “[t]he Japanese were seen as superhuman;
yet in 1924 Congress agreed that all Asians should be barred from immi-
gration.”27 This statement is certainly warranted by the picture the ex-
clusionists painted of the “yellow race” as so thrifty, cunning, enterprising,
untiring, proud, and expansionist that whites couldn’t possibly compete.
Nevertheless, many of those who professed nothing but admiration for the
Japanese and argued that the exclusion drive was not based on a percep-
tion of racial inferiority, only racial difference, reveal in other statements a
distaste that indicates something more emotional than a mere intellectual
conviction that different races cannot successfully live together. A good
example of such “double vision” (or double standard, at any rate) is pro-
vided by Representative MacLafferty’s (CA) comments in the House. In his
speech, he stated:
I am an admirer of the Japanese people. I know the Japanese people
in their own country, and I would to God that our young manhood
and young womanhood were growing up with the knowledge and habit
of work and industry that the Japanese young women and young men
possess. I said that I am an admirer of the Japanese; but above all
and beyond all, I admire them most in Japan and not on the Pacific
coast of North America.28
Many declarations of this type were made in the debate over exclusion;
many of them were also similarly contradicted in other contexts by more
off-hand utterances. In MacLafferty’s case the contradiction came only a
moment later: when asked about the Japanese in the schools, he explained
that “while the Pacific coast loved Theodore Roosevelt, his demand that we
admit the Japanese men to our schools and allow them to sit besides [sic]
our little American girls came near costing him our friendship.”29
27Fuchs, Kaleidoscope, p. 116.
28Congr. Rec., vol. 65, p. 5680
29Congr. Rec., vol. 65, p. 5681
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The Japanese, then, had no way of convincing white Americans that
they could make good citizens: the barrier of race, which it was hopeless for
them to argue with, thoroughly disqualified them—without stirring contro-
versy: unlike the Southern and Eastern Europeans, the Japanese received
practically no sympathy and even less support from native Americans. In
fact, the political and military power of Japan was probably the only thing
that had kept back anti-Japanese legislation so far: Roger Daniels notes
that “[h]ad Japan been a weak nation, as China was in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, there is little doubt that some kind of Japanese
exclusion legislation would have passed Congress in the first decade of the
twentieth century.”30 As Japan, however, was a nation to be reckoned with,
the problem was for some time dealt with through diplomacy, and between
1906 and 1924 the Japanese immigration was controlled through the Gen-
tlemen’s Agreement. This was not a formal treaty but rather an executive
agreement between Japan and the United States: it stipulated that Japan
was to stop issuing passports to its laborers bound for the U.S., while the
U.S. on its part would not pass discriminatory legislation against Japanese
immigrants.31
Though the exclusionists made a number of long speeches stressing the
racial unacceptability of the Japanese and the urgent need to prohibit them
from entering, most of the debate itself concerned problems with regulation
of immigration through treaty. The exclusionists argued that the Gentle-
men’s Agreement was not effective, and that in any case, it was an aberra-
tion in immigration policy. They argued that Congress had the sole power
to legislate on immigration, and were resentful of Japan’s protests, brand-
ing them as attempts by a foreign power to control American policy and
30Daniels, Not Like Us, p. 74.
31Daniels, Not Like Us, p. 74.
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decision-making. The Secretary of State, Charles Hughes, repeatedly urged
Congress not to offend Japan through exclusionary measures, and pointed
out that applying the quota system to the Japanese would practically ex-
clude them.32
The economic and military power of Japan made the exclusion fervor a
rather embarrassing political problem. In an article published in the Politi-
cal Science Quarterly in 1923, Raymond Leslie Buell discussed the problem
of exclusion. Unlike most congressmen, Buell considered there to be “ab-
solutely no racial characteristic which is responsible for” either the higher
birthrate of the Japanese or the fact that they accepted lower wages, arguing
that both of these would disappear if the standard of living of the Japanese
immigrants is “raised through the processes of Americanization,” though
he stated that “it will be impossible to Americanize, even to the slightest
extent, a steady stream of Orientals.”33 He agreed, therefore, that Japanese
exclusion was desirable. However, he pointed out that Japan had consis-
tently opposed the inclusion of the words “ineligible to citizenship” in U.S.
immigration law, even when those words would not have affected Japanese
immigration, and stated that any exclusion policy should be such as to con-
vince Japan “that we insist on exclusion, not because of racial inferiority,
but because of racial difference.”34 Accordingly, he advocated a recipro-
cal exclusion treaty that would have prevented American labor from going
to Japan and vice versa; this, in his opinion, should have been combined
with granting the Japanese immigrants already in America eligibility for
citizenship to enable and encourage them to adapt themselves to American
32Charles Hughes to Albert Johnson, reprinted in Congr. Rec., vol. 65, pp. 5585–7.
Japan wouldn’t have received a quota of more than a few hundred immigrants under any
version of the quota system based on the census of 1890.
33Buell, Development , p. 76.
34Buell, Development , p. 81.
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life.35
Unlike Buell, congressmen were not about to advocate giving Japanese
the right to citizenship: on the contrary, there was an attempt to include a
provision in the immigration bill to make sure Japanese ex-servicemen would
not be naturalized.36 However, the ineligibility of Japanese to citizenship
was often used as an argument for exclusion (with the logic, of course, that
as they could not become citizens, they could never fully participate in
American society and be properly Americanized). Most of those opposed to
the section of the immigration bill that excluded the Japanese explained that
they were not opposed to prohibiting the immigration of Japanese, but that
there was no reason to offend Japan as exclusion or near-exclusion could be
effected through either the quota system or the continuation of regulation
through treaty. They therefore had no quarrel with the view that different
races should be kept apart; rather, they were concerned that the specific
way in which the exclusionists proposed to do this would cause diplomatic
problems, hurt American economic interests, and make the United States
appear negligent of its treaty obligations.37
In a last-ditch effort to solve the problem to everyone’s satisfaction, a pro-
vision was added to the section excluding the Japanese which postponed the
date on which exclusion was to take effect to March 1, 1925, and requested
the president to negotiate an abrogation of “the present arrangement” be-
fore that time.38 Despite repeated reassurances that this would in no way
imperil exclusion and that very few Japanese could enter between July 1,
35Buell, Development , pp. 80-81. In Buell’s view, placing Japanese under the same
quota regulations as Europeans would have been satisfactory as well, but he considered
it unlikely that the quota system would be permanent, and therefore the exclusion issue
would resurface if solved under that system.
36Congr. Rec., vol. 60, pp. 3458–3460.
37See e.g. Congr. Rec., vol. 65, pp. 6249–6251, 8229–8230, 8245.
38Congr. Rec., vol. 65, p. 8225.
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1924 (when the other provisions of the bill went into effect) and the March
1, 1925, the exclusionists were not satisfied. They argued, logically enough,
that if the phrase meant nothing then there was no reason to insert it, and
insisted that Congress was the sole governmental body with the power to
regulate immigration and could not yield to requests from foreign nations.
As it turned out, the exclusionist drive was strong enough to override
concern about diplomatic affairs, and on May 16, 1924, the New York Times
headline read: “Congress Adopts Early Japanese Ban: Huge Votes for Ex-
clusion.” The article explained that “not a single protest” had been raised
against exclusion, and the conference report of the bill had been accepted
308 to 58 in the House and 69 to 9 in the Senate.39 On May 26, President
Coolidge signed the bill, though he declared that he would have vetoed it
had it been only about exclusion.40
Southern and Eastern Europeans
Racial considerations were not limited to Asian immigrants, but significantly
influenced the debate over the “new” (i.e. Southern and Eastern European)
immigration as well. This is evident not only from the immigration re-
striction discussion itself, but from the fact that the chairman of the House
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Albert Johnson, had close
connections with eugenists and was, in fact, appointed honorary president
of the Eugenics Research Association in 1923.41
It should be noted, however, that the significance of racial views regard-
ing European immigration can be overstated. Whereas restrictionists saw
race as the all-important factor in the question of Japanese exclusion, their
39NYT, May 16, 1924
40NYT, May 27, 1924.
41Ludmerer, Genetics, pp. 74-75.
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view of Southern and Eastern Europeans was more varied, and racial ar-
guments not only alternated with economic and social ones but were also
relatively ambiguous.
First of all, the racial divide between the old and the new European
immigration was by no means an uncontroversial issue. To be sure, the new
immigrants had met popular prejudice and negative stereotypes ever since
they began to arrive, but the perception that they were racially different
never became as solid as in the case of Japanese and other Asians. At no
point of the quota debates could restrictionists expect that racial arguments
against Europeans would be received without comment, either among their
fellow congressmen or among the general public.
Instances where arguments against Southern and Eastern European im-
migrants were based solely on race are very few; they were usually advanced
in combination with other arguments (such as economic factors, the danger
of an immigrant “flood” etc.). Even when emphasizing the new immigra-
tion’s inferiority to the old, the speakers commonly framed their argument in
terms of cultural, historical and environmental factors rather than in terms
of hereditary causes.
That race-based arguments against Southern and Eastern Europeans
remained controversial and ambiguous shows that the efforts of the racial
theorists were not fully successful: a number of congressmen denounced
racial categorization of European nationalities as ridiculous pseudo-science,
while others were sympathetic toward the idea but did not adopt its rigid
scientific argumentation. While it cannot be doubted that the perception
of new immigrants as inferior was instrumental in the passing of the quota
acts, that idea of inferiority is in most cases more appropriately described
as cultural or ethnic prejudice than as coherent racial ideology.
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This is not to deny that many arguments presented in Congress clearly
drew upon the emerging scientific racism. Often these arguments focused
on the problem of preserving national unity, as exemplified by these remarks
by Representative Vaile:
It has been also stated in argument that we are all immigrants, or the
sons of immigrants. [. . . ] I submit that it means absolutely nothing
[. . . ] because it ignores the great fundamental truth [...] that the
people of the United States have a distinct European history, that
they are of distinct racial stock [...] That racial stock is, as I shall
endeavor to prove to you, at least three-fourths of the Nordic race. It
is not the only good race in the world, but it happens to be the race
of most of the people who are here. [...] Other stocks are fine, but
a nation [...] is a country where they have a history of their own, a
language of their own, institutions of their own, and enough national
consciousness to preserve them. We are starting here this very day on
a policy of preserving what we have. 42
Even when actual racial classifications were not referred to, strong prejudice
was often displayed. One representative, in discussing the three percent bill
in 1921, declared that it was not discriminative enough:
Behold the immigration policy, the unutterable national stupidity that
can not or will not discriminate between the gentleman of English,
French and German culture on the one hand, and the bashibazouk,
with his traditions of murder, plunder and assassination on the other.43
While this particular representative was more graphic in his comments than
most, his views were shared by many: one of the major accusations leveled
at Southern and Eastern Europeans was that, coming from countries where
disorder and tyranny reigned, they had not learned to respect the law or the
government.44
The impact of race thinking gained momentum as time passed and the
eugenists’ campaign intensified. By 1924, the racial composition of the im-
migrant stream had received extensive attention in the press, and there was
42Congr. Rec., vol. 60, p. 3970.
43Congr. Rec., vol. 61, p. 555.
44See e.g. Congr. Rec., vol. 60, pp. 173, 230; vol. 61, pp. 502, 3456; vol. 65, pp. 5665
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no doubt that the permanent law was intended to control America’s eth-
nic composition by employing the 1890 census as the basis of calculating
national quotas. This drastically reduced the quotas allotted to Southern
and Eastern Europeans, most of whom had arrived after 1890, while allow-
ing most Northern and Western Europeans larger quotas than they wished
to fulfill. As one representative commented: “So far as I am concerned, it
would be all right to go back [to 1790] and begin anew and let nobody in this
country except those who have Anglo-Saxon or Nordic blood throbbing in
their veins”45—but as the 1890 census was the first to include classification
by nationality, that would have to serve.
Opponents of the 1890 census basis accused its advocates of unfair dis-
crimination toward Southern and Eastern Europeans. Originally, the advo-
cates of that census basis had conceded that their intention was indeed to
“change the character of our future immigration by cutting down the num-
ber of aliens who can come from southern and eastern Europe” because “on
the whole, northern and western Europe furnish the best material for citi-
zenship.”46 Under increasing pressure, however, they now responded with a
rather entangled line of reasoning, which asserted that using the 1890 cen-
sus was not discrimination, since it most accurately reflected the “national
origins” of the U.S. population. In other words, they argued that if one
counted not only the foreign-born, but the whole population of the country,
and classified that by the nationalities of their ancestors, then the end result
would be more or less the same breakdown as reflected in the foreign-born
population in the country in 1890. Accordingly, Senator David A. Reed
and John B. Trevor, “a patrician New Yorker who belonged to the circle
of Madison Grant” and was something of a grey eminence in the drafting
45Congr. Rec., vol. 65, p. 5677
46Johnson, Immigration, p. 50.
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of the 1924 Act, proposed that the census-based quota should in time be
replaced by a national origins system, to be determined by a study of the
national origins of the U.S. population. This way, “one could claim to offer
exact justice to every ethnic strain in the white population.”47
The claim of the justice of the national origins scheme did not confuse
the opponents of changing the census basis. As one of them sneered,
The proponents now say that they do not discriminate while the whole
of the so-called scientific study carried on by this Doctor Laughlin—
and the first syllable is spelled L-a-u-g-h—was to prove that we ought
to discriminate against southern and eastern Europeans, because they
are inferior.48.
Whether the claims of non-discrimination swayed the opinions of undecided
congressmen or the general public is impossible to ascertain, though the
necessity to emphasize fairness seems to indicate a fairly high measure of
opposition to racializing European immigrants. What is certain, however,
that the national origins proposal succeeded in setting the terms of the
debate. From now on, the debaters were locked into a rather fruitless tug-
of-war, where both sides accused each other of discriminative intent. The
opponents of the 1890 census reiterated their earlier objections, while its
proponents claimed (rather ingeniously) that it was the 1910 census which
was discriminative, because it gave Northern Europeans a much smaller
quota than was warranted by their total (foreign-born and native) presence
in the country. In other words, even if the national origins system didn’t
quell the objections to using the 1890 census basis, it did shift the focus by
redefining the concept of “fairness” in immigration policy. In 1921 many of
the opponents of the temporary measure had emphasized that the idea of
quotas was in conflict with traditional American principles of looking not at
47Higham, Send These to Me, pp. 55-56; see also Higham, Strangers, pp. 319-321.
48Congr. Rec., vol. 65, p. 5617
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a man’s origins but at his individual worth; now, however, the debate was
so utterly centered on how to divide the quotas that the question of whether
the quotas themselves was acceptable no longer entered the discussion.
3.2.2 Immigrants and the Economy
Traditionally, immigration had been considered an economic question first
and foremost. In good times, immigrants had been seen as a resource,
rather like a return on an investment which someone else had made, while in
bad times they were accused of bringing down wages and becoming public
charges. By the 1920s, other considerations (such as national unity) had
eclipsed economic ones, and while they still had a prominent position in the
debate, they were rarely presented as the only or even the main issue to be
considered in the planning of immigration policy.
Economic arguments were still fairly often used in the debate over the
emergency measure in 1920-21: the postwar recession and the high unem-
ployment rate, as well as fears of an “immigrant flood,” were among the
factors that prompted congressmen to advocate suspending or drastically
restricting immigration. They argued that the standard of living would
inevitably be brought down if more immigrants were allowed to enter an
already overflowing job market, and that this in turn was unfair toward
American workers and would lead to general unrest as unemployment in-
creased. This argument depended on two premises: one, that there in fact
were high numbers of immigrants waiting to enter the American job market
(and that this entrance would not be compensated by a comparable emigra-
tion), and two, that the economy would not be able to absorb them. Much
energy and paper was spent on proving the case either way, the proponents
of restriction marshaling reports of Europeans clamoring to buy steamship
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tickets and even of European governments planning to “dump” their poor on
America, and opponents trying to contradict these with statistics of return
migration and reports of labor shortages in various industries.49 However,
the debate had an undercurrent of fear that statistics could not sooth; what
was at issue was not the specific economic situation at any one point, but
rather the very survival of the nation’s economic system.
This fear was at the root of the arguments concerning the “flood” of
prospective immigrants. One representative, for example, argued that
the flow from overpopulated and economically impoverished countries
will continue until there is no longer any inducement in the United
States as against the home country. That is to say, until our density
of population and economic condition approximates [sic] that of the
country whose standard is lowest.50
Others contended that the immigrants, upon arriving in the United States
and not finding the lucrative employment they had expected, would turn
radical—and that the result of all this would be that the U.S. would begin
to resemble European countries and become a society ridden with class con-
flict. Here, too, it is evident that many restrictionists did not consider the
economic situation to be the crucial factor; rather, they felt that charac-
ter of immigration was the fundamental problem, only accentuated by the
economic situation. They argued that the U.S. was now receiving entrants
that in all respects were inferior to earlier immigrants: the new immigrants
were not the enterprising and industrious sort that had built the nation, but
a type that was accustomed to thinking in terms of class and would react
accordingly when placed in an economically challenging situation.51
Another aspect considered important by the restrictionists was that not
49See e.g. Congr. Rec., vol. 60, pp. 179–180, 184–185, 187; vol. 61, pp. 515–518, 567,
585, 924–925, 964.
50Congr. Rec., vol. 60, , p. 141.
51See e.g. Congr. Rec., vol. 60, p. 187.
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only were the aliens arriving in huge numbers, but the great majority of
them were staying in the cities, contributing to congestion and unemploy-
ment. Various amendments were proposed at different stages of the bill
regarding the distribution of immigrants; the intent of these amendments
was to encourage (or force) a portion of the arriving immigrants to settle in
rural areas and do farm work. While most congressmen were unanimous that
it would be a good thing if more immigrants were to engage in agriculture,
they did not believe this could be achieved through legislative means.52
Despite the economic hardships of the early twenties, opponents of re-
striction attempted to use economic arguments in their favor: they brought
in statistics showing that there was dearth of labor in various areas, argued
that “labor creates labor,” and asserted that immigrants were needed to do
certain kinds of manual labor that Americans were unwilling to perform.
They had little success, however. The fear inspired by the prospect of “alien
hordes” that would change the face of America was stronger than pragmatic
considerations, and the ideal of “wholesome” Americanism often prompted
restrictionists to argue that if it was the case that foreigners were needed
to do “our dirty work,” then that situation should be remedied rather than
supported: “I do not wish to see Americans sit and become opulent, inac-
tive, and weak,” one representative declared, and continued: “Through work
and energy we become strong [. . . ] To become soft is to become decadent.
Let us instill into the minds of every American, whether native or foreign
born, that this is the great land of opportunity, where work counts and per-
severance wins success.”53 In addition, many restrictionists argued that the
question was too important to be decided on economic grounds only; that
52The farm labor problem was eventually resolved in the 1924 Act by giving immigrants
“skilled in agriculture” second preference—after immediate relatives of citizens—within
the quota, to be applied to immigrants from countries whose quota was greater than 300.
See Sec. 6a, Immigration Act of 1924 , p. 155. Moreover, as Western Hemisphere migration
was not affected by the quotas, Mexican immigrants could come to the U.S. as seasonal
agricultural workers.
53Congr. Rec., vol. 61, p. 585.
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if increased production of goods could only be secured by reduction
of Americanism, by lowering our standards of living, by replacing the
English language with a medley of other tongues, by substituting for
American communities polyglot colonies where our Constitution and
laws are neither respected nor understood, by changing the character
of our race—then production is bought at too great a cost.54
In the discussion regarding the 1924 Act, economic arguments received
much less attention. The focus in that debate was mostly on the quota basis
and the question of Japanese exclusion (see section 3.2.1). In addition, the
general economic situation was improving. Restrictionists still occasionally
pointed out that immigrants had become unnecessary from an economic
standpoint, and supported their argument by referring to wartime produc-
tion and the economic upturn which had taken place despite the emergency
quota law. Opponents of restriction, similarly, tried to defend immigrants
by citing their contributions to the American economy; these, however, were
not really arguments for immigration but rather attempts to exonerate the
new immigrants from accusations of being consumers rather than produc-
ers and generally “scum” that could only detract from, not contribute to,
American wealth.
3.2.3 Saving American Institutions
Racial and economic arguments for immigration restriction were backed up
by another factor: a vague but pervasive sense of alarm over what high
numbers of immigrants would do to American society. This sense of alarm
is displayed over and over again in the debates; indeed, the perception that
America is in grave peril seems to be so commonplace that the speakers
often omit to specify either the causes or the manifestations of this peril.
More detailed statements, however, reveal that the fear of immigrants is
54Congr. Rec., vol. 61, p. 509.
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intimately connected to fear of radicalism, subversion and disloyalty.
The suspicion that immigrants held “un-American” principles and that
their impact, if not their very intention, was to utterly change the American
society was what gave force to the demand for swift and decisive action on
immigration. Nearly all congressmen who spoke in favor of either suspension
or restriction in 1920-21 alluded at some point to the imminent danger to
“American institutions” if drastic measures were not adopted. The state-
ments rarely specified either the institutions or the concrete danger, but kept
to vague language that intimated a nationalism apprehensive of everything
foreign: Congress must act so “that we may have time to make sure that this
country and its institutions shall not be impaired or destroyed by the foreign
element,”55 everyone’s aim should be “to add to the glory, power and influ-
ence of this Nation and to preserve uncontaminated the true American spirit
of the fathers who built this government” and to “teach more Americanism
and less Europeanism.”56 Speaking against an amendment to insert an ex-
empt for farm labor into the suspension bill, one representative remarked
that this would “admit the whole scum of creation into the United States”
and that far from doing this, Congress should make suspension a perma-
nent law and “prevent all foreigners from coming into the United States to
live.”57
The purportedly huge flock of immigrants, while important in the eco-
nomic argument against immigration as well, was an even more alarming
prospect when combined with that there was a “flood tide of bolshevists,
anarchists, and bomb throwers”58 waiting to enter the country; that “Lenin
and Trotski are carrying on a propaganda [sic] in this country [and] scores
55Congr. Rec., vol. 60, p. 181.
56Congr. Rec., vol. 60, p. 181.
57Congr. Rec., vol. 60, p. 230.
58Congr. Rec., vol. 60, p. 229.
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of their agents are seeking admission here in order to carry on their devilish
work in America” and that immigration restriction was necessary in order
to keep out “dangerous and deadly enemies of the country.”59
Radicalism, and occasionally all labor organizing, was by this time in
many minds inextricably linked to alien ideas and immigration (see section
2.3.2). For example, when Representative Sabath, one of the staunchest
defenders of new immigrants in Congress, asked Johnson whether he was
aware that the Washington Post had reported the AFL to be opposed to
the emergency quota bill, the following exchange ensued:
Mr. JOHNSON of Washington. I do not think that the great body
of the Federation of Labor has acted on this matter, their leaders here
may have acted in opposition, but if they have it would not make any
difference. (Applause). Their leaders acted ahead of the last election,
and with what result?
Mr. FOCHT. What language is that printed in? Is it Yiddish?
Mr. SABATH. No, it is the Washington Post.
While Focht’s comment shows how readily all labor activity was attributed
to “foreign” influence, the sneering tone employed by Johnson (who was the
chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization and
one of the principal authors of the bill) also calls to question the sincerity of
the concern for the American workingman that restrictionists professed to
have.
The depth of the fear of radicalism and foreign influence is clearly il-
lustrated in the discussion surrounding certain proposed amendments. For
example, Representative Blanton introduced an amendment (which was re-
jected) to strike out the provision of the bill that exempted bona fide stu-
dents from the quota limitations. Blanton argued that the provision would
admit “men who claim to be students, and yet who enter the universities
of our land for no other purpose than poisoning the minds of the American
59Congr. Rec., vol. 60, p. 3449.
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youth.”60 Similarly, in defending his amendment to reduce the quota further
to one percent of the foreign-born population, Representative Quin argued
that the bill was not strict enough, that it was going to “allow professors to
come, and they may come in here with all their anti-American spirit, with
the ideals of bolshevism, and all other dangerous isms, and demoralize the
communities wherever they may go into.”61
Especially instructive is the opposition to Representative Sabath’s amend-
ment which proposed to exempt political refugees from the quotas. Sabath
contended that it was an established American tradition to admit political
refugees, and that moreover “every civilized nation” granted asylum to such
persons.62 The restrictionists professed horror at this prospect, declaring
that such an amendment would oblige the U.S. to let in communists from
countries whose regimes were opposed to them, and that if “Lenin and Trot-
ski should be overthrown by the people of Russia, under this amendment
that whole coterie of bolsheviks could come en bloc to the United States.”63
Moreover, they argued, the world situation was so unstable that the coun-
try would be overrun with people claiming to be political refugees.64 In
an unusually irrational turn, some representatives voiced concern that the
passage of the amendment would mean that if Kaiser William was to seek
asylum in the U.S. he would have to be admitted, political refugee as he
was—a concern which, as Representative Cockran noted, proceeded “on the
extraordinary theory that [. . . ] refugees would seek the country from which
they were refugees.”65
60Congr. Rec., vol. 60, p. 233.
61Congr. Rec., vol. 61, p. 572. Professors, like bona fide students, were allowed to
enter even after the quotas had been filled, though, unlike students, they were counted in
the quota if they entered before it was filled.
62Congr. Rec., vol. 61, p. 581.
63Congr. Rec., vol. 61, p. 582.
64Congr. Rec., vol. 61, p. 588.
65Congr. Rec., vol. 61, p. 585.
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What the concern over American institutions amounted to, then, was a
combination of anti-radicalism and jingoistic nationalism. Practically every
proposal to relax the restrictiveness of any part of the bill elicited immediate
clamor about the “hordes” of entrants that would result, usually intensified
by claims that those entrants would be of the very worst kind. Similarly,
attempts to argue against the law on the basis that it was unfair to prospec-
tive immigrants prompted restrictionists to contend that American interests
should be the only ones considered by the American Congress, and that no
foreign governments should be allowed to dictate American policy.66
This nationalism is displayed also in the question of immigrant loyal-
ties. Interestingly, the accusation of disloyalty seems to have been made
more often in the debate in 1923-24 than in the one in 1920-21. There are,
to be sure, examples of this accusation in 1920-21 as well; one representa-
tive, for example, suggested that numerous immigrants withdrew their first
papers (i.e. applications for citizenship) during the war in order to avoid
draft, and proposed that all such immigrants should be deported.67 How-
ever, those congressmen opposed to the bill cited figures which showed that
certain foreign-born groups had enlisted in greater numbers than the general
population, and they were apparently fairly successful in arguing that immi-
grants had displayed extraordinary courage and loyalty during the war. In
addition, most immigrants (and especially the new immigrants under such
attack) came from countries that had been allied with the U.S. during the
war, which gave the opponents of the measure an added weapon. These
factors probably made the question of loyalty a somewhat unattractive one
to restrictionists, and they tended to keep to the broader and more popular
issue of the immigrants’ alleged anarchist and bolshevist affiliation.
66See e.g. Congr. Rec., vol. 61, pp. 568, 588; vol. 65, pp. 5643, 5647, 5675.
67Congr. Rec., vol. 60, p. 245.
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Many scholars have argued that although the intensive post-war Red
Scare was short-lived, it had a more lasting impact, associating all kinds of
social reform with radicalism, bolshevism and alien influence for the rest of
the decade.68 This is evident in the debate over immigration restriction as
well. In 1920-21, the rhetoric of the restrictionists was awash with direct
references to bolshevism, the Russian Revolution, Lenin and Trotski, and
the membership of aliens in radical organizations. By 1923-24, these direct
references had dwindled, but the sense of menace loomed as large as ever.69
Fear of subversion had not disappeared; it had merely taken a different form.
The threat of foreign ideas was now more directly connected to immigrants
from Southern and Eastern Europe, rather than to immigrants in general,
and occasionally combined with the racial argument against them (see sec-
tion 3.2.1). One of the major accusations leveled at the new immigrants
was that they did not adopt American ideals but rather remained loyal to
their countries of origin: “Foreigners are coming into our country who to
all intents and purposes hold allegiance to the land from which they came,
and they send back home millions of dollars every year.”70 While they were
now rarely accused of direct involvement in radical organizations, the new
immigrants were nevertheless vilified on the basis that they congregated
in ethnic ghettoes, espoused a “hate for government,”71 and brought with
them “strange customs and ideals of social justice.”72. According to the
68See e.g. Goldberg, Discontented America; Coben, Study in Nativism.
69There are a few plausible reasons for the reduction in anti-radical rhetoric: on the
one hand, the excesses of the Palmer raids and other facets of the Red Scare had to
some extent discredited such violent rhetoric; on the other, the Bolshevist Revolution had
not landed on American shores, the more radical labor organizations had been virtually
annihilated by the earlier hysteria and the American Federation of Labor was sounding
an increasingly cooperative note, all of which made references to radicalism seem rather
superfluous.
70Congr. Rec., vol. 65, p. 6376.
71Congr. Rec., vol. 65, p. 5665.
72Congr. Rec., vol. 65, p. 6461
CHAPTER 3. ARGUING RESTRICTION IN CONGRESS 67
restrictionists, the country was therefore in grave danger of becoming un-
recognizable, and curbing immigration was the the only way of performing
“our duty to maintain [the country] for ourselves and as an example for the
world.”73
In addition to doubting immigrants’ loyalties, the restrictionists ques-
tioned the motives of everyone who suggested that the legislation was unfair
toward certain nationality groups and might therefore affront foreign coun-
tries. Such suggestions prompted accusations that those making them were
worried of losing the “foreign vote” in their districts, as well as angry dec-
larations that “[e]very true American should distinctly understand that it
is the inherent right of our country to determine who shall and who shall
not come to our shores.”74 Foreign governments had no right to protest
against American policies, and Americans themselves should certainly put
American interests before all others.
The task of “saving American institutions,” then, was the all-important
issue which drew together every strain of argument against immigration,
whether economic, social, or racial. Especially in the early stages of the
debate, when suspension (for a period ranging from six months to ten years)
was the proposed remedy for immigration, the restrictionists often employed
such phrases as “a breathing spell” and “taking stock”; in other words, there
was a strong sense that things were moving too fast and it was necessary
to stop and review the situation before more serious harm would result.
This language, and more generally the almost hysterical concern for “the
American way of life,” may have reflected apprehensions in the face of the
substantial change taking place in the American society. While immigrants
were hardly the source of this change, they were an easy target for the anger
73Congr. Rec., vol. 65, p. 5689.
74Congr. Rec., vol. 65, p. 5675.
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it aroused.
Chapter 4
The Anti-Immigrant Climate
The Congressional debate, while covering a major portion of the standard
arguments against immigration, does not give a full picture of the anti-
immigrant impulse in the early 1920s. Especially on the subject of race and
ethnicity, the tone of Congressional discussion (whether through conviction
or through political necessity) tended to be somewhat more muted than the
one played by the popular press or by some of the organizations supporting
restriction. While some congressmen did give full vent to their hostility
toward immigrants, many others felt the need to emphasize that their views
were the result of rational deliberation, not of hatred or bigotry.
In addition to these explicit declarations of impartiality, the congres-
sional debaters also simply refrained from referring to certain arguments:
for example, advocates of restriction practically never stated that new im-
migrants were undesirable because many of them were Jewish or Catholic.1
Whatever the reason for this was, it was not the absence of such sentiment
1The early stage of the debate in 1920, however, does contain e.g. a report (Congr.
Rec., vol. 61, pp. 497–499) on the prospective emigrants in the European ports; the report
especially draws attention to the number of Jewish emigrants. In addition, occasional
references that indicate the acceptability of anti-Semitism also appear in the Congressional
Record ; see e.g. the quote on page 63.
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in the society in general. Anti-Catholicism, a significant force in earlier
bouts of nativism, was a significant factor in American life in the twenties
as well; the Ku Klux Klan, for example, focused extensively (and in some
areas primarily) on the political influence of Catholics, claiming that these
“agents of Rome” were arming for battle. Similarly, anti-Semitism was com-
mon both in populist and elitist forms: Henry Ford’s Dearborn Independent
published crude articles elaborating on Jewish control of practically every
aspect of American life, and colleges throughout the U.S. instituted methods
of limiting the enrollment of Jewish students.
To understand the full breadth of the restrictionist climate in the early
twenties, then, examining only the debates of Congress is not sufficient.
While the questions of race and ethnicity probably elicited the broadest
variation in viewpoints, it is also informative to look at how the other as-
pects of immigration that Congress considered—the role of immigrants in
the economy and their alleged radicalism—were represented by other fac-
tions of the society. The “alien menace” was many things to many people:
labor leaders feared the immigrant’s impact on wages, while patriotic orga-
nizations abhorred his alleged radical tendencies; even the eugenists, whose
primary policy impact was to solidify the racial basis of restriction, differed
on whether it was the immigrant’s individual or racial heritage that mattered
most to his America’s future.
4.1 Theoretical and Popular Prejudice
4.1.1 The Influence of Eugenics
Theories of race, developed by social scientists and eugenists in the years
after 1910, had a considerable impact on immigration restriction. These
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theories and their popularization did much to stir up alarm about immigra-
tion and support for restriction; they were probably even more instrumental
in bringing about the nationality- or race-based form that restriction took.
The ideas of leading eugenists were widely reported in the popular press (es-
pecially the Saturday Evening Post) and the eugenists themselves wielded
great influence as lobbyists on the Capitol.2 To some extent, racial the-
ories also converged with popular prejudices in condemning Southern and
Eastern Europeans, and it is reasonable to assume that even where the the-
ories themselves did not explicitly indict a specific group (e.g. Jews), the
relationship between theory and popular negative stereotypes was mutually
“beneficial”—i.e., the prejudice against certain groups made people more re-
ceptive to racial theories, while racial theories made popular prejudice seem
“scientific” and more acceptable.
Probably the most active and influential eugenist in the 1920s was Dr.
Harry H. Laughlin, who worked at the Eugenics Records Office at the Cold
Spring Harbor Laboratory.3 In the twenties, Laughlin researched the “im-
migrant stocks by nationality and specific type of defect—the feebleminded,
the insane, the criminalistic and the like.”4 Laughlin also served as an
“expert eugenics agent” on the House Committee on Immigration and Nat-
uralization on the request of its chairman, Albert Johnson.5
In a statement regarding the “biological aspects of immigration,” Laugh-
2King, Making Americans
3King, Making Americans. The Eugenics Record Office was established in 1910 on the
initiative of Charles Davenport, one of the first eugenists in the U.S., who also became
the office’s director. The initial funds were provided by Mary Harriman (the widow of
E.H. Harriman, founder of the Union Pacific Railroad); in 1918, the financing passed to
the Carnegie Institution of Washington. Laughlin, whose political activities on behalf
of eugenics Davenport supported, became the superintendent of the new office (he had
previously worked as an instructor in agricultural breeding at the Northeast Missouri State
Normal School). See Allen, Davenport .
4Laughlin, quoted in King, Making Americans, p.173
5King, Making Americans; Higham, Strangers
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lin explained that “[t]he character of a nation is determined primarily by
its racial qualities; that is, by the hereditary physical, mental, and moral or
temperamental traits of its people.”6 For this reason, he recommended that
in regulating immigration the United States should conduct elaborate stud-
ies of the prospective immigrant in his home town, because that was the only
place to get the “eugenical facts” and to ascertain that he and his “family
stock” had “such physical, mental, and moral qualities” as should exist in
America’s “future citizenry.”7 To emphasize the urgency of stock selection,
Laughlin referred to the disproportionate numbers of foreign-born in insane
asylums—this, first of all, cost the states money, and second, meant that
the U.S. was receiving inferior stock which would corrupt the American race.
This corruption, according to Laughlin, was inevitable because the birth rate
was higher among the immigrants than among the native-born, and because
it would be impossible to preserve racial purity, since “[w]herever two races
come in contact, it is found that the women of the lower race are not, as a
rule, adverse to intercourse with men of the higher.”8
Although Laughlin contended that immigrant selection was not princi-
pally a question of national origin but of verifying the eugenic qualifications
of the individual immigrant, he went on to point out that the “lower or less
progressive races” such as Mexicans appeared to furnish a disproportionate
number of the inmates of prisons and institutions. Moreover, the distinc-
6Laughlin, Statement , p. 3
7Laughlin, Statement , pp. 3–4
8Laughlin, Statement . Laughlin was not the first one to call attention to the foreign-
born in mental and other institutions; it had been a growing theme since 1900, although
public alarm was aroused mainly as the result of the popularization of Laughlin’s research
in the twenties (King, 2000). Among social scientists, the claim hadn’t gone unchallenged,
however—for example, when Prescott F. Hall had made the argument regarding New
York asylums in the early 1910s, H.L. Reed of Cornell University had pointed out that
if adjusted for age and sex distribution, the percentage of foreign-born in insane asylums
was 37 (against Hall’s claim of 48), not greatly higher than their percentage of the total
population, which was 31. Reed, Immigration
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tion between racial and family stock, while not exact in Laughlin’s writings
either, was even more blurred in the popular debate, and the general per-
ception apparently was that “science” showed the new immigrants to have
an undesirable biological heritage.9
Other eugenists and sociologists supported Laughlin’s line of argument,
and were also more explicit on the question of the new immigrants’ effect
on the “American race.” An important contribution to the anti-immigrant
climate was made by Madison Grant, whose Passing of the Great Race, Or
the Racial Basis of European History, published in 1916, was in vogue in
the early 1920s.10 This book, which described the various racial types of
Europe and the results of their interbreeding and settlement in the colonies,
was to become the major source of inspiration to other writers elaborating
on the danger of admitting “undesirables.”11
Grant, who was a lawyer by training but a naturalist by inclination,
served as vice president of the Immigration Restriction League from 1922
until his death in 1937. His influence on immigration law did not stop at
the theoretical or even the lobbying level, however: he also “used his legal
skills to help write and pass the National Origins Act of 1924.”12 Unlike the
Congressional advocates of restriction, Grant was not averse to describing
some races as superior and others as inferior; according to him, the basic
external yardstick of superiority was lightness of the hair, eye and skin color,
although he combined this with such traits as stature and skull form. Draw-
ing upon the concept of “survival of the fittest,” Grant argued that since
9Laughlin, Statement ; King, Making Americans
10Barrett and Roediger, Inbetween Peoples
11King, Making Americans. Interestingly, the book remained relatively unknown
through the war years, despite Grant’s efforts to make it more applicable to the Ameri-
can situation by revising the racial status of Germans for a 1918 edition of the book, in
which references to early American settlers as Teutonic were eliminated and modern-day
Germans were defined as Alpine rather than Nordic. Higham, Strangers, p. 218.
12Cooke, Grant
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“fittest” did not mean “best” but rather “the best suited for the environ-
ment,” if the truly best elements of the human race were to survive they
would have to be separated from the lower races which tended to crowd
them out by breeding more.13 Grant did not deny that in principle, dif-
ferent races could coexist: for example, he contended that “as long as they
remain in the same relation to the whites as in the past, the negroes will be
a valuable element in the community, but once raised to social equality their
influence will be destructive to themselves and to the whites.”14 But he did
argue that in practice the preservation of racial purity was impossible—and
as he believed that interbreeding resulted in the domination of the “lowest
and most primitive elements,”15 he considered it necessary to curtail the
presence of those lower elements in the American society. This could be
accomplished through restrictions on immigration and through controls on
the reproduction of the “undesirable” members of the society (such as the
insane, the deaf, and the lower classes in general).16
Grant also wrote the introduction to Lothrop Stoddard’s The Rising
Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy, which deplored the trend
that was giving increasing power to the “yellow, brown, black and red”
races in world politics. Although mostly focused on non-Europeans, Stod-
dard also discussed the “Alpine” and “Mediterranean elements” and warned
that if the “Nordics” did not take care to protect their superior character-
istics, the changed demands of the industrial world would bring the lower
elements into prominence and result in the degeneration of the Nordic race.17
Stoddard also appeared before the House Committee on Immigration and
13Grant, Passing of the Great Race
14Grant, Passing of the Great Race, pp. 78–79
15Grant, Passing of the Great Race, p. 81
16Grant, Passing of the Great Race
17Stoddard, Rising Tide
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Naturalization on a number of occasions. Like Laughlin, Stoddard sup-
ported the 1924 quota law which employed the 1890 census, characterizing
it as a “great turning point in Americas national and racial destiny.”18 Stod-
dard combined his racial grounds for opposing immigration with a number
of other standard arguments employed by restrictionists, such as the dan-
ger of a flood of immigrants unfriendly toward America and uninterested in
American ideals.19
In a later book, The Revolt Against Civilization: The Menace of the
Under-Man (1922), Stoddard elaborated on the danger that “lower ele-
ments” presented to the Western civilization of the Nordics. The opening
phrases state the main argument succinctly:
The revolutionary unrest which to-day aﬄicts the entire world goes
far deeper than is generally supposed. Its root-cause is not Russian
Bolshevik propaganda, nor the late war, nor the French Revolution,
but a process of racial impoverishment, which destroyed the great civ-
ilizations of the past and which threatens to destroy our own.20
In other words, after having applied the biological interpretation to world
politics in The Rising Tide, Stoddard now elaborated on the role of biology
in the domestic politics of a nation. He argued that the progress of a civ-
ilization was limited by the racial qualifications of its bearers: as a people
reached higher levels of civilization, complexity of life increased, and even-
tually the pressures created by this complexity would become too intense
for the majority of the population, causing the civilization to founder. The
heights a civilization could reach were, then, determined by the mental qual-
ities of the race that propagated it: if that race degenerated either through
the addition of “inferior stock” or through some process that favored the
multiplication of the “lower elements” within the race itself, the point of
18Stoddard to Johnson, quoted in King, Making Americans, p. 192
19Stoddard, Statement
20Stoddard, Revolt , p. v
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foundering would of course be reached earlier.21
While Grant, too, had asserted that “[i]n many countries the existing
classes represent races that were once distinct,”22 Stoddard took this idea
one step further in coining the term “Under-Man,” which he defined as “the
man who measured under the standards of capacity and adaptability im-
posed by the social order in which he lives.”23 These “under-men” were, in
other words, the ones who did not have “the capacity to keep pace” with
the increasingly complex demands of civilization, and therefore could not
be successful in that civilization. Not being successful, they became discon-
tented and envious of those who, because of their greater mental abilities,
could succeed. In time, this discontent and envy led to unrest and revolt as
the “under-men” strove to destroy the achievements of the higher classes and
force down the civilization to a level where they themselves could prosper.24
This, then, was Stoddard’s explanation of the discontent prevalent in
the society: far from being an indication of faults in the social order, it
merely showed that a civilization had risen to such a high level that an ever
greater portion of the population simply could not “keep pace.” Accordingly,
Stoddard argued that while “reform of abuses may diminish the intensity
of social discontent,” this was not an effective response in the long run,
because the problem was not the society but those of its members who
were “incorrigibly hostile to civilization.” Therefore, he recommended that
rather than cling to the “emotional” and unscientific “doctrine of equality,”
society should recognize the “iron law of inequality” and strive to promote
the breeding of its “superior” members as well as limit the procreation of
21Stoddard, Revolt
22Grant, Passing of the Great Race, p. 5
23Stoddard, Revolt , p. 21; emphasis in original.
24Stoddard, Revolt , pp. 20–22
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the “inferiors.”25
Such a view of societal unrest is especially interesting in the context of
the fear and hatred that Congress displayed toward the new immigrants on
account of their alleged tendencies to class consciousness and radicalism (see
section 3.2.3). Stoddard’s explanation, by making radicalism the result of
hereditary defects, not only reinforced the idea of “radical races”26 but also
reinterpreted radical tendencies among the native population in the light of
biology. Workers’ demands reflected not defects in the society but defects in
the workers themselves.27 Stoddard supported his argument by presenting
numerous tables of intelligence test results, grouped respectively by social
status, national or geographical origin, and race. Predictably enough, these
tables invariably showed that white, native-born Americans of high social
status (as defined by occupation) were the most intelligent.28 The fact that
the highest social classes achieved the highest intelligence scores was not,
according to Stoddard, a result of their better education or of other en-
vironmental factors; rather, it proved that “the dynamic urge of superior
germ-plasm surmounts environmental barriers and raises the individual so-
cially; while, conversely, inferior individuals tend to sink in the social scale.”
This meant that the more advanced a civilization, the further this process
would have advanced; hence the great differences in intelligence between
classes were most visible in advanced societies such as the U.S.29
25Stoddard, Revolt , pp.23,30–31,222–223
26See Higham, Strangers, p. 138
27Stoddard wasn’t blind to the presence of members of other than the working class
in radical movements. He explained that these upper or middle class persons were either
“border-liners” whose capacities fell just below the requirements for success, “misguided
superiors” who idealistically thought that society’s problems could be solved through
revolt, or “innately capable” men who had been deprived of their “birth-right” to success
through chance. Not having achieved success in “normal” ways, they compensated through
acquiring leadership roles in radical organizations composed of their inferiors. Stoddard,
Revolt , pp. 23–24
28Stoddard, Revolt , pp. 59–67
29Stoddard, Revolt , p. 72
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While Stoddard was perhaps unusually categorical in assigning practi-
cally all of society’s ills to the degeneration of its racial make-up, his views do
provide an interesting perspective on the relationship between race/ethnicity
and class. From its inception, eugenics had been not only a branch of sci-
ence but a movement, and many eugenists and other academics agreed with
Stoddard’s general proposition that man should take advantage of the “pos-
sibility of his own perfection by methods at once safe and sure” that eugenics
provided.30
There were other prominent academics who researched the impact of
hereditary factors on society and who lent their weight to the cause of im-
migration restriction; these included such persons as sociologist Henry Pratt
Fairchild, who published copiously in professional journals in the first quar-
ter of the 20th century, and wrote more popular books as well.31
Despite the importance of these academics in affecting both public opin-
ion and official policy, it should be noted that not all social scientists were
convinced of the primacy of heredity in human affairs. Indeed, by the 1920s,
the majority of articles that appeared in professional social science journals
preferred the environmental perspective over the hereditary one. Neverthe-
less, the policy influence of social science tended toward restriction, as those
social scientists whose articles appeared in popular magazines mostly fa-
vored the hereditary view.32 Several popular writers were also influenced by
30Stoddard, Revolt . In addition to similar trends in the writings of other proponents of
eugenics, such as Grant, Fairchild and Laughlin, the fact that Stoddard quotes at length
from fairly numerous works expounding views similar to his own also indicates that the
general bent his ideas were anything but unusual.
31Fairchild, Melting-Pot ; see also Fairchild, Literacy Test ; Fairchild, Paradox ; Fairchild,
Immigrant Backgrounds. It should be noted, however, that Fairchild’s view of race ap-
pears to differ somewhat from those of Grant or Stoddard: in Immigrant Backgrounds,
Fairchild seems to assign race with very little other function than that of group unity
(which isn’t clearly defined) and defines as purely cultural such elements of society as po-
litical organization, moral code, or arts. In Paradox of Immigration, however, he accepted
the argument that native births declined as the result of immigration.
32Satariano, Immigration. Satariano suggests a few possible reasons for the hereditary
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the works of Grant and Stoddard, and articles on the general undesirability
of Southern and Eastern Europeans abounded. These articles freely blended
“scientific,” racial arguments with all manner of indictments, accusing the
new immigrants of class thinking, low standards of living, bolshevism, clan-
nishness, and “bad blood” with equal conviction. One of the most fervent
publisher of anti-immigrant articles was the best-selling Saturday Evening
Post, although it by no means held the monopoly of anti-immigrant ar-
ticles.33 Collier’s, for example, published two articles on immigration by
the advertising specialist George Creel. Creel reiterated the standard argu-
ments (importance of homogeneity, unassimilability and bad racial character
of new immigrants, etc.), but he also employed an unusually persuasive tone
and provided his reader with a ready-made letter to send to Congress in or-
der to “close the gates.”34 The New York Times mostly kept to a more
sedate line: while accepting that restriction in some form was necessary, it
generally condemned discrimination in its editorials and in 1924 included a
series of critical columns on the Johnson-Reed bill by Max J. Kohler, who
had been active in opposing immigration restriction.35
view’s dominance in the popular press: restrictionist articles may have been specifically
solicited, the younger and less established proponents of the environmentalist view may
have been less inclined to expose themselves to status loss through publishing in popular
magazines, etc.
33King, Making Americans; see also e.g. Saturday Evening Post, February 12, 1921,
March 4, 1922, May 5 and December 8, 1923, September 6, 1924; Collier’s, July 1, 1922
and May 17, 1924. On the Post’s later attitude to Mexican immigration, see Mohl,
Saturday Evening Post .
34Creel, Close the Gates! ; Creel, Melting Pot or Dumping Ground? . Besides being an
advertising man, Creel had directed the Committee of Public Information, the World
War I propaganda agency, and therefore was an influential person. Through the CPI he
had also been involved in wartime Americanization. See Kennedy, Over Here: The First
World War and American Society , pp. 41, 65–66.
35Kohler had previously cooperated with Louis Marshall of the American Jewish Com-
mittee in opposing restriction but had in 1921 decided that “a brief temporary legislative
curtailment of immigration [. . . ] might be in order” Leonard, Louis Marshall . Kohler
remained opposed to the 1890 quota basis; his columns appeared in the NYT on e.g. Jan
5, Jan 7 and Jan 24, 1924.. Editorials on the Johnson-Reed bill in the NYT appeared
on e.g. Feb 9, Feb 17, Feb 26, Apr 24, and Apr 27, 1924. While the NYT had been
opposed to the 1890 quota basis as discriminatory, it contended that there was “merit
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4.1.2 Patricians, Patriots and Klansmen: Organizations in
Support of Restriction
While the restrictionist social scientists and race theorists were effective
lobbyists in their own right, a number of organizations shared their general
cause and were active in publicizing it. Some of these organizations, such
as the Immigration Restriction League of Boston (see section 2.3.1) and
another, New York –based organization by the same name, had immigration
restriction as their main agenda, while other associations of a more general
nature contented themselves with endorsing proposed restrictive legislation
and passing blanket resolutions calling for restriction.36
Like popular magazines, the associations interested in immigration re-
striction facilitated the spreading of the notion that Southern and Eastern
immigrants had been “scientifically” proved inferior (or more generally, that
the 1920s immigration legislation was solidly based on science). Most of
these associations, in relying on science to support their prejudice against
Southern and Eastern Europeans, were more interested in drawing broad
conclusions that condemned the new immigrants than in understanding or
critically examining the work of the eugenists. This meant that although
scientists could be challenged in professional journals on the specifics of their
studies, the effect of these challenges on the agenda of immigration restric-
tion was very limited: the details of the debate rarely reached the popular
magazines, and the associations promoting restriction tended to refer to
in the proposal” of calculating quotas based on the “racial and national origins” of the
whole population, because “it is both natural and wise that the American race wishes to
preserve its unity and does not care to see the present blend greatly changed.” (Editorial
on April 4, 1924).
36It should be noted that to some extent, the membership roster of the restrictionist
organizations, especially that of the Immigration Restriction League of Boston, read like
a list of the nations prominent eugenists; in other words, the pressure exerted by such
groups was not entirely separate from the lobbying activities of individual eugenists.
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science in a manner vague enough to be practically unassailable.
An example of the imprecise character of allusions to science is provided
by Francis H. Kinnicutt’s statement to the House Immigration and Nat-
uralization Committee. Kinnicutt represented the New York Immigration
Restriction League, which, he said, had an active membership of 20,000.
Kinnicutt explained that his organization advocated “a certain reasonable
adjustment of certain racial lines,” and opposed basing the quotas on nat-
uralization figures because “there’s nothing scientific in that”—instead, he
and his association endorsed the principle of using the 1890 census as the
quota basis, though he did not explain what made this more scientific.37
Similarly, a number of patriotic societies endorsed restriction, often re-
ferring in vague ways to the “racial differences” between old and new immi-
grants. For example, Mr. Dwight Braman, president of the Allied Patriotic
Societies, appeared before the Senate committee to speak in favor of the
1890 quota basis, which he said would prevent the further entry of people
who were “widely divergent in their racial qualities from the races which
were settled here before.”38 The American Legion, too, supported restric-
tion. Although the Legion was primarily organized to protect the interests
of war veterans, it also had a deep interest in opposing all kinds of subver-
sion; fear of Bolshevism was the main factor in the Legion’s opposition to
immigration, although immigrants’ alleged disloyalty during the war and the
problem of unemployment also played a role.39 The Patriotic Order Sons
37Kinnicutt, Statement . Kinnicutt also wished Mexican immigration to be put under
the quotas because Mexicans, obviously, were even less assimilable than Southern and
Eastern Europeans.
38Braman, Statement , p. 74
39Lax and Pencak, Creating the American Legion; Baker, American Legion, pp. 26–
30,51–58. The Legion also lent explicit support for Japanese exclusion (see NYT, Mar 12,
1924), although its stand on the racial issue in general was not emphatic, and Goldberg
notes that some of its chapters had joined the opposition to the Ku Klux Klan because
these chapters’ “definition of 100 percent Americanism did not exclude African Americans,
Catholics, or Jews” Goldberg, Discontented America, p. 132.
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of America went somewhat further, sending a representative to the House
Immigration Committee hearings to speak for restriction; the representative
mostly framed his arguments in terms of the immigrants’ radicalism and
their propensity to commit serious crimes, and presented the resolution of
his organization which called for deportation of dangerous enemy aliens and
the suspension of immigration for two years, as well as the continuing of
Asiatic exclusion policies and further restriction “by numerical limitation of
nationalities according to percentage aliens naturalized.”40 Similarly, the
Daughters of the American Revolution (which had also been active in the
Americanization movement) responded favorably to restriction, including
the use of the 1890 census as a quota basis.41
Another popular organization emphatically supportive of immigration
restriction but not focused exclusively on it was the Ku Klux Klan. The
Klan, “revived” in Georgia in 1915 by William Simmons, had by the early
twenties become a significant social force. During this period the Klan was,
as one historian puts it, a “many-splintered thing,”42 each chapter adjusting
its focus to fit the interests of the community where it functioned. Never-
theless, anti-immigrant agitation, and especially anti-Catholicism and anti-
Semitism, were crucial facets of the Klan appeal. Standard Klan rhetoric re-
viewed the gamut of traditional anti-Catholicism, reiterating the arguments
that Catholics bowed to a foreign power and plotted to gain full control
of America in order to destroy American political freedom and democracy.
The attack on Jews was at least as virulent, condemning Jewish political
and economic influence. Very often Catholics and Jews were also lumped
together in claims that heretic and un-American forces were “taking over”
40Patten, Statement
41NYT, April 19, 1924.
42Miller, The Ku Klux Klan, p. 215
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and threatening the country. New immigrants, being largely non-Protestant
and having a reputation for labor radicalism, were an important target of
Klan hatred.43
Although many condemned the Klan both during its heyday and after
its post-1924 decline, it carried a reasonably respectable public image in
the early twenties. The Knights of a city or town commonly represented
a fair cross-section of its economic make-up: only the unskilled and the
elites were underrepresented. This provides something of an index of the
acceptability of open anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic sentiment, and indicates
that such sentiment wasn’t confined to the less educated classes. This is not
to deny that only a small minority of members engaged in violent vigilante
activities, or that the Klan occasionally defined bootleggers and corrupted
politicians, rather than Jews and Catholics, as the primary threat. The
Klan’s flexibility and its skill to zero in on the questions that most interested
the community in which it operated were of momentous importance to its
growth. Nevertheless, intolerance toward non-Protestants was proclaimed
by the Imperial Wizard and other high officials forcefully enough to make it
more than probable that even when these issues were not the main concern
of a specific chapter, they were at least tacitly accepted.44
Another indication of the acceptability of anti-Semitic sentiment at the
time is the practice of restricting Jewish college attendance, either explic-
itly or through less obvious methods (like selective admission policies which
included questions about religious affiliation and/or required students to
submit photographs with their applications). After World War One, these
policies became prevalent at several American universities, including such
prestigious institutions as Harvard and Columbia; often, they were directed
43Jackson, KKK ; Horowitz, Klansman; Goldberg, Hooded Empire
44Jackson, KKK ; Goldberg, Hooded Empire
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at Jews of Southern and Eastern European, rather than German, back-
ground. Moreover, contemporary surveys of student attitudes indicated a
high level of prejudice against Jews (as well as against other ethnic, racial
or religious groups).45
There are, then, indications that while derogatory references to Jews
and Catholics were practically absent from the Congressional debate, this
did not mean an absence of hostile sentiment in general. Open hostility was
just not politically expedient: anti-Semitic statements, especially by public
persons, consistently aroused vocal protest. For example, in April 1921 the
Secretary of State Charles Hughes submitted to Congress an immigration re-
port which indicated that prospective immigrants were largely composed of
“Jews of an undesirable type” as well as other slum dwellers. The front-page
New York Times story on the report, headlined “Hughes Asks Rigid Immi-
gration Ban,” caused a great stir and and prompted Hughes to deny that he
had given any opinion on immigrants and explain that he had merely trans-
mitted requested consular reports to the House Immigration Committee.46
Similarly, the president of Harvard University, Abbot Lawrence Lowell, who
had openly condoned restricting Jewish admission, was severely criticized
for his views.47
Other racist statements regarding Europeans often called forth protests
as well, although it appears that the response was more powerful when the
statements were made against Jews; Jewish organizations were also among
the most active in opposing the quota laws, probably further diminishing
the willingness of restrictionists to provide them with additional proof of
discriminative intent. Another possible factor contributing to the scarcity of
45Wechsler, Rationale for Restriction; Lewis, Parallels and Divergences
46NYT, April 20 and 21, 1921.
47Wechsler, Rationale for Restriction, p. 651.
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direct anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic statements in the debate is that, unlike
the vague “Southern and Eastern Europeans” or even vaguer “immigrants of
a lower type,” terms like “Jew” and “Catholic” indicted a specific group or
individual. This meant that the person who had made the statement would,
in case of opposition by members of that group, have much less leeway in
arguing that he really meant somebody else.48
4.2 Societal Groups and Restriction
As is clear from the Congressional debates as well, race or the new im-
migrants’ character in general weren’t the only grounds for supporting re-
striction. Indeed, one of the most intriguing (and perhaps most confusing)
aspects of the 1920s immigration legislation is the sheer volume of restric-
tionist sentiment coming from different quarters of the society. Often, too,
the groups that united in supporting restriction were ones that otherwise
had conflicting interests. Immigration restriction seemed to be the one issue
that could receive the backing of eugenists as well as black leaders, Boston
patricians and populist organizations, manufacturers and labor organizers.
Arguments against immigrants could be advanced from widely divergent per-
spectives, so restriction seemed to bring some good for everyone and take
little away from anyone (except, of course, from immigrants themselves).
The major opposition to any kind of limitations on immigration had tra-
ditionally come from business, for obvious reasons: the greater the supply
of labor, the lower the wages. In the 1920s, too, most industrialists were
against restriction, and indeed all of the representatives of industry who
48The strategy of speaking against a group while excepting specific members of that
group was often employed in Congress on the subject of Southern and Eastern European
immigrants; there were, after all, several congressmen of Southern or Eastern European
descent, which forced even the most stringent nativists to at least pay lip service to the
possibility that inferior races could occasionally produce superior individuals.
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appeared before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization
spoke in opposition to the quota laws.49 The major business organizations
that voiced their dissatisfaction at the prospect of restriction included the
National Association of Manufacturers and the Inter-Racial Council, an or-
ganization representing “hundreds of the largest industrial corporations in
the country,” which had sprung from the Americanization movement under
the guidance of Frances Kellor.50
The opposition of business was still formidable—but not as vigorous as
it had been: industry, having been a major actor in the Americanization
movement, was itself beginning to feel nagging doubts about the stability
of a society which received hundreds of thousands of new members yearly.
And, though the idea of aliens as synonymous with radicals (and vice versa)
had served industry well in the battle against labor organizing, there was a
kernel of truth in the equation, and some were beginning to wonder whether
pro-business propaganda and Americanization programs were sufficient to
check the impulse toward radicalism. Similarly, while businessmen benefited
from the labor provided by immigrants, they were by no means immune
to the racist view of Southern and Eastern Europeans that was gaining
popularity in the twenties. And perhaps most important of all, the profits
of the war years had been quite satisfactory, despite nearly non-existent
immigration: machinery was increasingly employed to accomplish the tasks
that had formerly been the responsibility of unskilled workers—the labor
group that immigration mostly provided.51
In the late teens and the early twenties representatives of business occa-
sionally sounded a somewhat more favorable note toward restriction. For ex-
49Calavita, U.S. Immigration Law
50Calavita, U.S. Immigration Law , p. 153
51Montgomery, Fall ; Vittoz, World War I
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ample, Richard H. Edmonds, the editor of the Manufacturer’s Record stated
that he regretted that manufacturers were “thinking of their present needs
instead of studying more deeply the evils which would come to the country
in the future through increased immigration from southern Europe.”52 C.
Coapes Brinley, a sales engineer, argued that the solution to the labor prob-
lem was not “letting down the bars to the unskilled, uneducated hordes of
southeastern Europe”—instead, manufacturers should make more efficient
use of machinery. Brinley went on to say that the use of machinery had
other benefits, namely that “money invested in American machinery would
go into American homes” and that machinery would provide “a permanent
solution of the problem now confronting the American manufacturer,” the
unreliability of labor. Unlike the worker, “[m]achinery ‘stays put.’ It does
not go out on strike, it cannot decide to go to Europe, or take a job in the
next town.”53
Although “business interest” is often used as if all manufacturers had the
same needs, in the 1920s the positions of different industries regarding the
need for labor were very different. Industry representatives often opposed
the Quota Acts, but they did not necessarily oppose restriction as such: ma-
jor industrial journals pointed out that restricting immigration was perfectly
acceptable and even necessary, and their main concern was to ensure that it
was carried out in such a form as to secure employers’ access to additional
foreign labor if an unusual need for it should arise. This was, in fact, car-
ried out in the final version of the 1924 Quota Act, both through allowing
immigration from the Western Hemisphere and through giving the Congress
discretion in adjusting the 150,000 quota ceiling of the national origins plan
52Edmonds, Restriction, p. 323
53Brinley, Shall We Let Down the Bars, pp.70–72
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in the case of an “abrupt or seriously disturbing” need for labor.54
In a logical contrast to business, organized labor had usually pressed for
increased regulation of immigration, and continued to do so in the 1920s.
However, despite the fact that immigration represented competition in the
labor market, workers’ support of immigration restriction was neither com-
plete nor unproblematic. The American Federation of Labor, for example,
had in its early years held a fairly strong immigrant constituency, and had in
the 1880s actually recognized two official languages, English and German.55
However, as the AFL was focused on skilled labor, it had little interest in
the new immigrants, most of whom worked in unskilled occupations. The
AFL’s strategy was to focus on bread-and-butter issues rather than on far-
reaching change, and to portray itself as the bulwark against revolution and
socialism; this tallied with the Federation’s support for immigration restric-
tion. The decision to support restriction, first made in the 1890s, originated
with the leadership and encountered significant resistance among the rank
and file members: Samuel Gompers’ proposal to support the literacy test
was in fact defeated at the 1896 AFL convention, though it was adopted the
next year after heated debate.56 In the unfavorable atmosphere of the early
twenties, the AFL emphasized its conservative nature even more intensively,
and as Southern and Eastern Europeans were increasingly associated with
radicalism, legislation against the new immigrants was a logical stance not
only from an economic but from a political standpoint as well.57
Other representatives of organized labor, such as the Industrial Workers
54Vittoz, World War I , pp. 76, 77–78.
55Dinnerstein et al., Natives and Strangers, p. 93.
56Calavita, U.S. Immigration Law , p. 111. The arguments against restriction at these
conventions, according to Calavita, flowed from the members’ conviction that the “men
of wealth” were a worse menace than the immigrant and that the immigrants were good
unionists.
57Montgomery, Fall , pp. 5–7; see also Wallace, Statement ; Green, The AFL and the
Middle Way .
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of the World and the Socialist Party, tended to have more sympathy for
the new immigrants and were critical of the racism displayed by the New
England elites and the AFL leadership.58 However, the anti-labor tone of
the early twenties that had heightened the conservative impulse within the
AFL had nearly demolished these more radical organizations, and in the
public debate the AFL represented the voice of labor.
Although the AFL occasionally embraced the racist rhetoric employed by
other restrictionists, its main emphasis was on economic aspects; it wasn’t
especially fervent in its advocacy of restriction in the 1920s, partly because
the issue was already promoted by so many other groups and partly because
many of the representatives and senators the AFL had endorsed in the 1922
election were adamantly opposed to the quota acts.59
Both labor and business, then, displayed a fair degree of ambivalence
toward immigrants during this period, although both still held on to their
traditional lines. In a sense, it may seem curious that in this business-
friendly era, the immigration question was seemingly resolved in favor of
labor. But as industry was no longer united on the question, mounting an
effective campaign was difficult. As the quota laws did not apply to the
Western Hemisphere, this preserved a “revolving door” which could let in
an additional supply of workers during times of labor shortage; also, black
migration to the North revived with the economic upturn in 1923, softening
the impact of the drop in immigration that had resulted from the temporary
1921 legislation.60
The same reason that had traditionally prompted labor to wish for fewer
58Calavita, U.S. Immigration Law
59Montgomery, Fall , p. 462
60Goldberg, Discontented America, pp. 155–157. Gompers had, in fact, tried to per-
suade Albert Johnson to incorporate Mexican and Canadian labor, too, in the quota plan,
but Johnson insisted that the bill would never pass in such a form. Levenstein, AFL and
Mexican Immigration.
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immigrants—economic competition—was also instrumental in creating black
support for restriction. When immigration had plummeted during the war,
the position of blacks in industry had improved significantly. Still, blacks
understood that little fundamental had changed, and feared that once im-
migration revived they would again be pushed to the bottom rung. Many
black papers therefore supported the various suspension measures proposed
immediately after the war, arguing that the war had shown how impor-
tant a hindrance immigrant labor had been to the advancement of black
Americans.61
While the economic argument for restriction was the one most employed
by blacks, many also shared white Americans’ fears that the new immi-
grants would imperil American institutions. But they did not call for limits
on Southern and Eastern Europeans specifically, as this would have im-
plied acceptance of race theories. But blacks did resent the fact that whites
preferred immigrants over native, English-speaking blacks; the tendency of
immigrants to quickly adopt American race attitudes did not escape them,
either. Moreover, the xenophobia of the Red Scare had its impact on blacks
as well, inducing some to advocate that blacks should actively portray them-
selves as 100 percent Americans in an effort to gain acceptance. Some also
believed that the concurrent race-inspired violence was instigated by aliens,
leading them to hope that whites, too, would see that condoning attacks on
non-whites fostered general lawlessness.
The majority of blacks hoped for stringent limitations on immigration so
that their own opportunities would increase, but they also wished that the
limitations would be on an individual rather than a group basis. Black news-
papers and leaders also spoke fervently against the Japanese exclusion clause
61Hellwig, Black Leaders
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of the 1924 Act (earlier anti-Asian measures had also prompted black oppo-
sition). The economic argument, however, tended to outweigh the distaste
for the racial implications of the quotas, and by 1924 most black newspapers
supported the Johnson-Reed bill.62
Farmers, like industrialists, were divided on the question of immigra-
tion: they wondered whether they could do without the extra labor, but
also shared the nation’s fears that immigrants would imperil the nation’s
future in ways that made economic considerations seem beside the point. It
wasn’t clear, either, that immigration would in any case help agriculture,
as most new immigrants stayed in the cities and as increased production
wasn’t necessarily the solution to farmers’ problems. These concerns were
extensively voiced in the Congressional debate over immigration, and rural
Congressmen proposed various plans for diverting the immigrant stream to
agricultural areas, arguing that farm life would Americanize the newcomers
and thereby solve the problem of immigrant ghettoes while benefiting the
rural areas which were the “backbone of America.”63
According to Wang, Southern agrarians in particular (represented chiefly
by the American Farm Bureau Federation) emphasized the need for more
farm labor; their Midwestern counterparts were more suspicious of the suit-
ability of the new immigrants for farm labor, or for American life in gen-
eral.64 Interestingly, Southern congressmen were among the most vocal in
demanding restriction, although many certainly did request that immigrants
headed for the farm be treated differently from others. The question was
finally solved by giving “bona fide farmers” preference within the quotas of
62Hellwig, Black Leaders; see also Goldberg, Discontented America; Barrett and Roedi-
ger, Inbetween Peoples
63Congr. Rec., vol. 60, pp. 225–232, 3454–3455; Congr. Rec., vol. 65, , pp. 6522–6528;
Wang, Farmers
64Wang, Farmers, p. 649
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the 1924 Act; more dramatic schemes like requiring immigrants to stay on
a farm for a number of years after arrival were opposed because of their
implications of indentured servitude and their impracticality. However, the
willingness of many to accept the immigrant so long as he didn’t stay in
the congested cities indicates that the disapproval of the immigrant wasn’t
as solidly based on his racial characteristics as is sometimes assumed, and
makes it rather difficult to clearly differentiate between generally derogatory
attitudes and actual belief in the new immigrants’ hereditary inferiority.
The debate in the larger society reflected the issues discussed in Congress,
although it had a slightly different emphasis and produced somewhat cruder
rhetoric. Groups like the Ku Klux Klan used older, familiar stereotypes to
incite fear and hatred against the new immigrants, while eugenists strove
to establish the framing of immigration policy in terms of race and heredity
as a scientific project untainted by emotions. In the popular magazines
and in the activities of various anti-immigration groups, however, these two
interpretations of immigrant undesirability blended relatively freely, and it
is difficult to gauge accurately the effect that eugenist theories had on the
general public or on the political debate. It seems likely that the major effect
of scientific racism was to make older prejudices and stereotypes seem more
respectable and logical, rather than replace them with a new view of race.
This is evident in the question of assimilability: it was far from unusual for
a writer or a speaker to both contend that Southern and Eastern Europeans
were unassimilable because of their hereditary traits, and yet accuse them
of not wanting to become “real” Americans and assimilate into the society.
In other words, asserting that “science” had shown new immigrants to be
incapable of becoming good citizens did not preclude charging them with
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unwillingness to do so.
Despite the growth of hereditary theories, then, the line between culture
and race was by no means clearly drawn—popular anti-immigrant feeling,
while utilizing science, was not limited by it. Furthermore, the restrictionist
project received support even from groups that were either indifferent or
hostile to race theories: the traditional economic interpretation of immigra-
tion had not lost its importance entirely, and groups (such as blacks and
labor organizers) that didn’t necessarily see the immigrant as a racial threat
nevertheless often worried about his economic impact. The claim that immi-
gration led to lower wages and thereby diminished the American standard of
living was also employed by Congressional restrictionists, although economic
arguments on behalf of immigrants could easily be countered by referring to
the broader dangers that an unchecked flow of newcomers would engender.
The economic question was also easily connected to the fear of immigrant
radicalism, which (like most of the perceived shortcomings of immigrants)
could be connected just as easily to race as to cultural and historical factors.
Stoddard was probably the most emphatic in his equation of societal dis-
content with bad hereditary qualities, but other writers echoed his ideas in
a somewhat less lucid form, and anarchism was often referred to as a “blood
disease” both inside Congress and outside it. Many groups and writers con-
sidered the immigrants’ un-Americanism—manifested in their radicalism,
clannishness, and disloyalty—to be of primary importance: whether this
un-Americanism was the result of culture or heredity, it did not bode well
for America.
Chapter 5
The Context of the Quota
Acts
5.1 Immigration Legislation in Other Countries
United States, although unique in the scale of immigration, was not the only
country drafting and implementing immigration legislation around the turn
of the 20th century. Other countries of high immigration, such as Canada
and Australia, were also debating the impact that immigration had on their
economies and on the level of cohesion in the society. European states, too,
were moving to stricter and more formal control of entry and naturalization.
The questions facing countries of high immigration were, of course, very
different from those that most European states were concerned with. More-
over, European states ranged from those that had only a handful of foreign
residents (like Sweden) to those that were home to a significant number of
adopted citizens (like Great Britain). It is therefore no surprise that while
the debates and the legislative measures adopted by countries like the U.S.,
Canada, or Australia had much in common, legislation in European coun-
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tries not only differed from that of countries of high immigration but also
showed considerable variation from one European state to another. Nev-
ertheless, several European countries did adopt and consolidate legislation
concerning immigrants in the early years of the twentieth century, empha-
sizing the growing importance of state control and state bureaucracy in the
Western world.
5.1.1 Countries of High Immigration: Canada, Australia,
and Latin America
Excluding Asians
In the United States, the issue of Asian immigration had been to a great
extent treated as a question separate from general immigration controls.
This practice was repeated in Canada and Australia: excluding Asians was
not seen as incompatible with permitting or even encouraging European
immigration. South Africa and a few Latin American countries pursued
similar policies as well, although to a more limited extent.
The decision of the U.S. to exclude the Chinese and, later, other Asians,
had a clear impact on the legislation adopted by other immigration countries,
as the migrants who could no longer enter the U.S. sought other destina-
tions. However, the impact was practical rather than ideological—in other
words, the perception that Asians could and should not blend into white so-
cieties was not confined to the U.S., and the American laws merely provided
a catalyst to legislative action that would off the threat of greater Asian
immigration.
In response to the U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Canada passed
a Chinese Immigration Law in 1885, requiring all entering Chinese to pay a
head tax of fifty dollars and restricting the number of Chinese a vessel could
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bring to one per fifty tons.1 Like its American counterpart, this law was
passed after the transcontinental railroad, which had employed by far the
greatest part of Chinese immigrants, had been completed. As Elizabeth Clif-
ford notes, the completion of the railroad was significant not only because it
removed the opposition of railroad magnates to Chinese exclusion, but also
because it made the “Chinese problem” one of national rather than regional
character. West Coast residents in both Canada and the U.S. had long com-
plained that the Easterners disregarded the question of Chinese immigrants
because they thought it didn’t concern them. Now, however, the Chinese
had both the motive—unemployment—and the means—the railroad—to mi-
grate to the East Coast as well.2
Between 1905 and 1925, Canada strengthened the restrictive measures
directed at Asians with such measures as the Continuous Journey Act in
1908, directed at East Indians, and the 1923 Chinese Exclusion Act, which
admitted only very few narrowly defined classes of Chinese, and practically
ended Chinese immigration. Finally, in 1930, the immigration of all Asiatics
(with very few exceptions) was expressly forbidden.3
The fact that British subjects were not exempted from any of the Asiatic
exclusion laws and that e.g. “Chinese” was defined in law as a question of
descent rather than of nationality emphasizes the special importance of race
in the question of Asian immigration. Indeed, one scholar noted in 1934 that
“[f]or the purposes of Canadian immigration law, mankind is divided into
two classes: the first comprises those who are of Chinese origin and descent;
1British subjects were not exempted in the law, but diplomats and their “suite and
servants” were. If the law was breached, penalties fell not only on the Chinese person but
on the master and the owner of the ship as well. Lee, Anti-Chinese Legislation in British
America, p. 359.
2Clifford, Racing the Nation, pp. 69–70.
3Clifford, Racing the Nation, pp. 92–94; Plender, International Migration Law , p. 50.
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the second those who are not of Chinese origin and descent.”4
Essentially the same division between Asians and non-Asians (or more
broadly, non-whites and whites) existed in Australian immigration law. The
earliest legislation to curb Chinese settlement was enacted in colonial times:
in 1855 the Victorian parliament imposed a limit on the number of Chinese
per tonnage a vessel could bring, as well as an entrance fee of £10, for which
the vessel’s captain was responsible. Within a few years of this, South Aus-
tralia and New South Wales instituted similar laws. However, the reduction
in Chinese immigration caused by the legislation and by economic factors
made the issue less pressing, and by 1867 these laws had been repealed.5
Ten years later, Chinese immigrants once again became the the subject of
parliamentary discussions, and Queensland restricted the entry of Chinese to
its newly-discovered gold fields through entry fees and limitations on mining
permits to Asians and Africans. In the 1880s, most of the other colonies
reinstated or introduced restrictive legislation, and by the 1888 Intercolonial
Conference the question had obviously become one of national importance.
The resolutions adopted at the conference aimed at uniform laws regarding
immigration, and most colonies acted on the recommendations that only
one Chinese be allowed to land from a ship per five hundred tons of the
ship’s registered tonnage, and that Chinese should not be allowed to enter
a Colony by land without a permit. At the 1896 Intercolonial Conference,
it was resolved that these restrictions should be extended to all non-white
races, including British subjects.6
When the Commonwealth was founded, the principle of “White Aus-
tralia” was therefore well entrenched. The Immigration Restriction Act of
4Descent and origin were determined solely by the male line. Angus, Canadian Immi-
gration, p. 76.
5Ryan, Immigration, p. 472.
6Ryan, Immigration, pp. 472–473.
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1901 instituted this principle through a provision that required each immi-
grant to be able to write down from dictation a passage of fifty words in a
European language; while this provision was ostensibly non-discriminatory,
the debates surrounding it made clear that the intention was to exclude all
non-European immigrants. At the protests of Japan the wording of the pro-
vision was in 1905 amended from “European language” to “any prescribed
language,” although the operation of the law did not substantially change.
The act fulfilled its exclusionary purpose fairly effectively. The only problem
was constituted by the Kanaka labor traffic from the Indian subcontinent,
which the Australian Government after 1904 dealt with by simply refusing
to issue the required entry permits.7
During all this time (with the exception of periods of economic distress)
immigration from Europe and especially Britain was encouraged and even
subsidized. As sea fare to Australia was expensive compared to the cost of
traveling to the U.S. or Canada, various free or assisted passage schemes for
specified classes of immigrants were introduced by the colonies. Mechanics,
farm laborers and domestic servants, especially, were recruited, and Euro-
pean immigrants who paid for their own passage received compensation in
the form of subsidized land.8 As was admitted by a number of U.S. legisla-
tors as well, the fundamental question wasn’t how many immigrants arrived,
but what those immigrants were like culturally and racially. In its explicit
focus on the whiteness of the population, the Australian debate resembles
the sentiments expressed on the American West Coast, where the main
focus had traditionally been on Asian rather than European immigrants.
Although Australia’s proximity to Asian countries prompted it to phrase
its legislation in less racial terms than the U.S. had done, the rhetoric sur-
7Ryan, Immigration, pp. 473–475; Plender, International Migration Law , pp. 48–49.
8Ryan, Immigration, pp. 474–475.
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rounding the laws quite directly declared that “the vision of the Australian
continent peopled entirely with a white race is magnificent. The turning of
the vision into reality is the ambition of all Australians.”9
In addition to Canada and Australia, a number of Latin American coun-
tries enacted specific restrictions on “non-European” races. These policies
were not widespread and their role in the countries’ general politics was
much more limited than in Canada or Australia. What is significant about
them is that they often were explicitly directed at non-European races rather
than nationalities: for example, Costa Rica in 1914 prohibited the entry of
“gipsies of any nationality,” and Ecuador in 1909 refused to admit a Chinese
laborer of U.S. nationality.10
The “Asian question” was also current in South African politics in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries. Sugar plantations developed in the mid-
19th century in the province of Natal required laborers, and as the local
blacks proved unwilling to do the work, the plantation-owners turned their
hopes to importing Indians to serve as indentured workers. An agreement
was negotiated with the government of India, providing that the imported
workers should be indentured for a period of five years, during which they
were to be furnished with acceptable food and housing and a set monthly
pay. At the end of five years, they were free to stay if they chose; after ten
years in South Africa they could receive free passage back to India, although
they also had the option of staying.11
The plan did not work exactly as the plantation-owners had hoped, how-
ever. There were repeated complaints of mistreatment from the Indian la-
borers, resulting in threats by the Indian government to end the agreement.
9Quoted in Duckworth, White Australia, p. 434.
10Plender, International Migration Law , p. 54.
11Taft and Robbins, International Migrations, pp. 339–340; Huttenback, Indians in
South Africa.
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And, at the end of their servitude, the laborers sometimes turned to pursuits
other than the agricultural labor or domestic service that the proponents of
the plan had envisioned as their role. Even more alarmingly, a number of
free Indians (mostly Muslims) immigrated at their own expense and engaged
in commerce, provoking complaints of unfair competition from white mer-
chants. Another significant factor in the increasing opposition in Natal to
the immigration of Indians was that the Indian population of that province
rapidly outstripped the Europeans. Consequently, the Natal Mercury, which
in the early years of the program had deemed it “the vitalizing principle” of
prosperity in Natal, was by 1895 ready to declare the “[t]he evils attendant
upon the immigration of coolies, their low standard of living and morals,
the introduction by them of disease [. . . ] are too generally appreciated to
leave room for contradiction.”12
As is apparent from the comment by Natal Mercury, the arguments
used against Indians in South Africa were very similar to those used against
Asians everywhere: low hygiene and living standards, corrupt morals, and
the accompanying element of unfair competition with whites. As had other
countries, South Africa took it for granted that Asians could not be accorded
the same rights as whites: their proper role in white societies (if any) was
that of temporary cheap labor. Accordingly, several municipal and national
laws limiting the rights of Indians were enacted, including the 1913 Immi-
grants’ Regulation Act that contained a dictation test similar to the one
instituted by Australia in 1901: the test, like that of Australia, was to be
administered in a European language. The test provision was bolstered by
a clause that any immigrant could be barred “on account of standard or
habits of life [. . . ] unsuited to the requirements of the Union,” effectively
12Quoted in Huttenback, Indians in South Africa, p. 274–275.
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ending Indian immigration.13
Attitudes Toward European Immigrants
Compared to the United States, Canada’s immigration policy regarding Eu-
ropeans was consistently somewhat more liberal, and in some aspects dif-
fered greatly. For example, whereas the United States discouraged and even
forbade explicit recruitment of immigrants, the Canadian government fo-
cused on trying to influence the composition of the immigrant flow through
selective recruitment.
The factors underlying the different policies of the two countries were
economic rather than social; that is, public sentiment in Canada was largely
worried about the same issues as in the United States, but Canada’s im-
migration policy was defined by its need for settlers and farm workers to
populate the West (and thereby make the newly built Canadian Pacific
Railroad profitable). Canada therefore aggressively recruited farmers with
promises of cheap or free land, and in the early years of the century by
far the strongest emphasis in policy was on the agricultural abilities of the
prospective immigrant.14
The immigration policy conducted at the turn of the 20th century by
the minister of the interior, Clifford Sifton, favored what Sifton called “the
stalwart peasants” from central Europe. Sifton contrasted these newcomers
favorably with urban workers from the English slums, who knew little or
nothing about farming. But in the minds of many Canadians, immigrants
from countries like Austria, Russia, or Romania, however good farmers they
might be, represented a threat to the cultural and political unity of the
13Quoted in Huttenback, Indians in South Africa, pp. 289–290; see also Taft and Rob-
bins, International Migrations.
14Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates, pp. 59–65
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emerging country, and many insisted that ethnic and cultural considera-
tions should come before economic ones. This, of course, echoes the similar
sentiments expressed in the United States. Nevertheless, the practice of
recruiting these immigrants as farmers gave these misgivings a slightly dif-
ferent flavor than they had in the United States. In Canada, the frontier
was not yet closed, and the reality of the need for rural population and the
policies that expressly promoted the immigration of “bona fide farmers” to
some extent prevented the connection between Southern and Eastern Eu-
ropeans and urban overcrowding that was so important in the American
immigration debate.15
Another American theme repeated in the Canadian debate was the al-
legedly higher percentage of criminality and insanity among the immigrants.
But here, too, the comparison between “British slum-dwellers” and “sturdy
peasants,” which had to a degree prevented the singling out of Southern and
Eastern Europeans as the offending group, caused the debate to focus less
on race and more on the individual immigrant. Accordingly, the preferred
solution to the problem of crime and insanity was to tighten the medical
and psychiatric inspection of immigrants on arrival. Eugenics was a factor
in Canada as well, although it, too, apparently centered more on individuals
than ethnic groups.16
Despite these differences, immigrants from Southern and Eastern Eu-
rope clearly aroused widespread suspicion. Sifton’s successor as minister
of the interior, Frank Oliver, began to promote the idea that the immi-
grant’s ethnic qualifications should take precedence over his occupational
abilities, and openly argued that the most desirable immigrants were those
from Britain and the United States, regardless of whether they hailed from
15Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates, pp. 59–77; Clifford, Racing the Nation.
16Dowbiggin, Keeping This Young Country Sane.
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urban or rural areas. However, the Immigration Act of 1906, drafted under
Oliver’s direction, made no reference to an immigrant’s nationality. This
was somewhat compensated by using the Act’s expanded categories of pro-
hibited immigrants to “influence the the racial makeup of the immigrant
stream.”17
The Immigration Act of 1906 marked the end of free entry to Canada:
it consolidated previous immigration legislation, increased the number of
excluded classes, and gave official sanction to deportation of undesirable im-
migrants. The subsequent Immigration Act of 1910 further expanded the
prohibited categories, added a clause allowing deportation on the grounds of
political or moral instability, and “conferred on the cabinet virtually unlim-
ited discretionary powers allowing it to issue orders-in-council to regulate the
volume, ethnic origin, or occupational composition” of the immigrants.18 As
was often the case in American debate as well, the main point of contention
was whether the economic benefits of immigration outweighed consideration
of the ethnic and cultural makeup of the nation. There was, however, a fairly
strong consensus on the need to separate “the wheat from the chaff,” and
the debate did not wax heated around either law.19
The First World War led to considerable anti-foreign and especially anti-
German sentiment in Canada, and was followed by a Red Scare similar to
that in the United States. An Immigration Act passed in 1919 increased
the restrictions on entry and included both a literacy provision and a clause
providing for the deportation of all persons who “by word or act in Canada
17The excluded classes in Canadian law were largely the same as in the U.S., covering
cases like persons with contagious diseases, lunatics, prostitutes, and destitute immigrants.
Before 1906, however, Canada did allow many of the classes prohibited on account of
mental or physical disabilities or lack of means to enter if they were part of an immigrant
family or if they had sufficient funds posted on their behalf. Clifford, Racing the Nation,
p. 95; Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates, pp. 77–80.
18Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates, p. 80.
19Quoted in Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates, pp. 81.
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seeks to over throw by force or violence” the government of Canada or the
United Kingdom, or “is a member of or affiliated with any organization en-
tertaining or teaching disbelief in or opposition to organized government.”20
This last part of the Act reflected the emphasis on immigrants’ role in labor
radicalism, also seen in the U.S.
Despite its concerns over the impact of immigration, Canada did not
enact legislation aimed at reducing the total number of immigrants in this
period. Instead, the need for labor led Canadians to anticipate the postwar
immigration boom with optimism rather than fear. The American Quota
Acts, too, only further intensified Canada’s recruitment policies to counter
the effect of more and more Canadians and immigrants to Canada moving
south of the border in search of more lucrative employment.21
In Australia, another country focused on recruiting immigrants, the poli-
cies mirrored those of Canada in many ways. Concern over Southern and
Eastern Europeans was expressed in Australia as well, and recruitment was
heavily focused on Britain, Scotland and Ireland, emphasizing the desire to
“keep above 90 per cent of the proportion of Australia’s stock of British
origin.”22 After the passage of the U.S. quota laws, Australia amended
the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 to allow “the Governer-General by
Proclamation to prohibit or impose quotas for the immigration of aliens of
any specified nationality, race, class or occupation where he deemed it de-
sirable” to do so for economic or social reasons. The provision was never
used, however; instead, immigration was regulated through recruitment and
British diplomatic channels.23
Restrictive tendencies were also apparent in some Latin American coun-
20Quoted in Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates, pp. 81.
21Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates.
22Taft and Robbins, International Migrations, p. 347.
23Ryan, Immigration, p. 475.
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tries, especially Argentina and Chile. The upper classes of these countries
were concerned about immigration in approximately the same ways and at
the same time as their counterparts in the United States: beginning in the
1890s, immigrants were used to explain “such varied problems as pauperism,
crime, labor unrest, and anarchism.”24 Again as in the U.S., this posed a
conflict between the belief in the economic necessity of immigration and the
fear of its social impact. And similarly, blaming labor unrest, poverty, and
social discontent on immigration furnished a way of evading examination
of the more fundamental causes these problems might have, and created
an atmosphere suspicious of social reform movements. Solberg notes that
the contentions that immigrants furnished a large proportion of paupers or
that they were especially prone to crime had little statistical support; in-
deed, these claims were often contradicted by statistics. Nevertheless, the
practice of blaming immigrants for these phenomena continued, and also
acquired racial characteristics: “by 1905 sociologists were beginning to up-
hold the Argentine creole as racially superior to several immigrant groups,
including the Italians and the Spaniards.” The immigrants’ biological in-
feriority, they argued, accounted for their allegedly greater propensity to
commit crime and for their involvement in prostitution and the white slave
trade.25
Both Argentina and Chile had for the previous half-century encouraged
immigration, and both had a tradition of giving equal rights to foreigners
and citizens. The turmoil and militant labor organizing in the early 20th
century, however, led many to question the wisdom of such policies, and
the first laws that specifically targeted foreigners were responses to these
concerns: Argentina passed a Residence Law in 1902 after a”huge anarchist-
24Solberg, Immigration and Urban Social Problems, p. 215.
25Solberg, Immigration and Urban Social Problems, p. 221, 223–225.
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led general strike at the height of the harvest season”26 and Chile did the
same in 1918, probably prompted by the Bolshevist Revolution in Russia.
These laws stipulated that foreigners who had been condemned of crimes,
who “preached violent social or political change,” or whose conduct the
president believed dangerous, could be expelled.27
Some upper-class Chilean and Argentine observers called for strict cur-
tailment of all immigration, but in both countries the economic demand for
immigrants (especially agricultural workers and settlers) was too strong to
be overpowered by fears of social unrest or theories of race, and the gates
remained open. The same was true for the vast majority of Latin Amer-
ican countries, and when restrictions existed they nearly always had an
economic rationale (Brazil, for example, restricted immigration significantly
in the 1920s, apparently in an effort to alleviate unemployment).28
5.1.2 European States and Immigration
Most European countries have traditionally been countries of emigration,
not immigration, and the issues regarding the entry of foreigners are there-
fore naturally very different from those faced by countries like the U.S. or
Australia. Nevertheless, European states, too, consolidated and tightened
their policies toward foreigners in the early twentieth century.
Of the European countries, the situation of Great Britain was probably
the one most similar to the United States in regard to immigration: although
principally a country of emigration, Britain also had an immigrant popu-
lation in some ways parallel to that of the United States. This was partly
due to the British empirical ideology, which (at least officially) stressed the
26Solberg, Immigration and Urban Social Problems, p. 228.
27Solberg, Immigration and Urban Social Problems, pp. 227, 229.
28Solberg, Immigration and Urban Social Problems; Fields, Closing Immigration
Throughout the World , p. 689.
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equality of all Commonwealth subjects, and partly the result of Britain’s
role as the leading industrial nation and its concomitant laissez-faire policy
in trade and migration.29
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, significant numbers of Jews,
fleeing the pogroms in Russia and Eastern Europe, arrived in Britain. This
provoked bitter resentment among British workers fearing for their jobs, as
well as apprehensions on the part of middle- and upper-class citizens about
the “quality” of these immigrants.30 The complaints against the Jewish
newcomers paralleled the objections to the “new immigrants” in the U.S.:
politicians and the press warned that the aliens were destitute and therefore
a burden to society, that their habits and background induced them to live
in unsanitary and crowded conditions, and that they were prone to crime.
Again, statistical evidence for these claims was rather tenuous. London’s
East End, where most of the newcomers went, was certainly crowded, but
as some observers pointed out, so were several districts that housed mostly
native-born Britons. A similar argument could be made regarding the aliens
receipt of poor relief. And, as Herbert Samuel pointed out, it was true that
aliens were responsible for a disproportionate amount of crimes, but not
necessarily in quite the manner that most people assumed:
[T]he percentage of persons sentenced to prison is no less than three
times as great among the aliens as it is among the general population;
recently the proportion has been rapidly increasing. It is noteworthy
that Americans, who are only one-tenth of the alien population, con-
tribute one-fourth of its crime; the Russians and Poles, who comprise a
third of the alien population, contribute only one-sixth of its crime.31
The agitation against the newcomers led to the Aliens Immigration Act
of 1905, which “forbade entry to people who could not support themselves
and their dependents, to people whose infirmities were likely to make them a
29Huttenback, Indians in South Africa; Layton-Henry, Great Britain.
30Layton-Henry, Great Britain, pp. 90, 98–99; Pellew, Home Office.
31Samuel, Immigration, p. 326.
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charge on the rates, and also to some known criminals.”32 The administra-
tion of the law was lax, however: it had been passed by a Conservative gov-
ernment, and the succeeding Liberal government was not enthusiastic about
the measure. Moreover, the administration fell to the Home Office, which
had traditionally only been concerned with immigrants from the viewpoint
of political stability, and in recent years had focused largely on anarchists. It
had little interest in the general problems of immigration, and had assumed
that if restrictive measures were to be passed, their administration would
fall on the Board of Trade or the Local Government Board.33
The First World War brought much stricter controls on the entry of
foreigners. Two days after the war broke out, the Home Secretary introduced
the Aliens Restriction Bill, which “enabled the King in Council to make
Orders to prohibit or restrict the landing or embarkation of aliens, Orders
to deport aliens, to require them to live in specified areas, to make them
comply with any provisions as to registration.”34 The Bill passed in all of its
stages on the day of its introduction, and was applied immediately. Though
passed as a temporary wartime measure directed primarily against spies,
the main provisions of the Aliens Restriction Act remained in force through
amendment in 1919, and it was the main policy instrument regarding aliens
until superseded by a new Aliens Order in 1953.35
As Richard Plender notes, the First World War caused marked changes
in immigration laws throughout Europe. Apart from specifically restrictive
legislation, the war had an important role in consolidating the previously
limited passport system for international travel, facilitating the tracking
of entries and departures and bringing travel under stricter administrative
32Layton-Henry, Great Britain, p. 90.
33Pellew, Home Office, pp. 370–371.
34Plender, International Migration Law , p. 58.
35Plender, International Migration Law .
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control. Many countries also enacted laws to either restrict or at least control
the entry of aliens. This was true even of countries that had a very low
proportion of foreigners: for example, Sweden enacted a Deportation Act
in 1914, which allowed the government to impose a regulative system in
times of emergency; in 1927, this was replaced by the more comprehensive
Aliens Act, meant to be temporary but extended several times and made
permanent in 1954.36
The different internal economic and social situations that the European
countries were faced with meant that their policies toward immigrants varied
significantly in the postwar years. For example, in order to facilitate post-
war reconstruction and alleviate its population shortage, France encouraged
immigration in the 1920s, while Switzerland worried about the population’s
growing heterogeneity and tried to induce its foreigners to become natural-
ized.37 However, immigration was not a significant enough question for any
of these countries for them to embark on strict restrictive legislation: rather,
they were content to merely consolidate their administrative control over the
entrants, passing various measures designed to control and occasionally limit
aliens’ residence and employment. Most countries did, however, deny entry
to destitute aliens, and the Depression of the thirties further tightened the
controls in this respect. The economic plight of the thirties also induced
some countries (e.g. France) to encourage aliens to return home, although
these attempts were usually less than successful.38
36Plender, International Migration Law ; Hammar, Sweden, pp. 17–18, 26.
37For the same reason—population shortage—the eugenics debate in France focused
much more on encouraging “proper” kinds of reproduction than on weeding out undesir-
able elements. See Schneider, Toward the Improvement .
38Verbunt, France; Hoffmann-Nowotny, Switzerland ; Plender, International Migration
Law .
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By the early thirties most Western countries had put an end to the laissez-
faire immigration policy that had characterized the latter part of the pre-
vious century. Everywhere, the concerns over immigration were in many
respects very similar to those that U.S. observers were voicing. Especially
the hostility toward Asian immigrants, displayed in most countries simulta-
neously with efforts to encourage European immigration, replicates similar
attitudes in the U.S.
In regard to European immigrants, too, the question of the ethnic and
cultural composition of the nation often caused heated debate. As in the
United States, the ethnic arguments were both buttressed and complicated
by explaining social discontent, crime, and labor unrest with the influx of
aliens and alien ideologies.
Not surprisingly, these concerns were most salient in countries of high im-
migration. In Europe, claims of immigrant criminality certainly contributed
to the popularity of restrictive laws, but they played a much smaller role.
The main thrust behind the tighter administration of entry and residence
was provided by broad factors such as the growing trend toward bureau-
cratization and economic protectionism, and by more specific developments
such as the First World War and the Great Depression of the thirties.
Despite the similarity of concerns in other countries of immigration to
those in the United States, only the U.S. instituted definite and strict re-
strictions on European immigrants. Canada, Australia, and Latin American
countries did introduce new regulations, but they also continued to recruit
immigrants from what they deemed to be desirable sources.
The greatest reason for this discrepancy is probably economical. In the
United States, fertile land was no longer readily available, the use of ma-
chinery had diminished the need for labor, and rapid population growth
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was no longer perceived to be an absolute requirement to prosperity—on
the contrary, slums, urban overcrowding, and the resulting social unrest
indicated that more population might represent a threat to wealth and eco-
nomic growth. In contrast, Canada, Australia, and Latin America all had
considerable tracts of untilled land, and their growing industries and devel-
oping infrastructures needed laborers. It seems, therefore, that the role that
long-term economic factors played in the American decision to limit immi-
gration were more significant than would appear from the debate regarding
restriction.
5.2 The Domestic Context
The brief review of the international immigration policies in section 5.1
indicates that both European states and countries of high immigration
brought immigration under stricter control in this period, rejecting their
earlier laissez-faire policies. On the other hand, none of the countries of
high immigration curbed entry as dramatically as did the United States.
The international trend toward growing control of immigration reflected
the rise of the modern, bureaucratic state as much as economic or nation-
alistic impulses. In the United States, too, the processes of urbanization
and specialization fashioned the country into an increasingly complex, im-
personal society, while at the same time the innovations in transportation
and communication both speeded this development and welded the country
ever more tightly into a national unit.
The growth of organization and bureaucracy in the United States was
apparent on several fronts in the first quarter of the 20th century. Corpo-
rations were bringing more and more specialized functions under one man-
agerial umbrella, universities were being transformed into “eclectic centers
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directed by professional administrators,” workers, industrialists, and farm-
ers all occupied themselves with the question of promoting their interests
through organization, and voluntary organizations of all shapes and sizes
cluttered the landscape. Increasingly, too, the organizational drive was a
regional or national, rather than a local one.39
The same trend toward organization also characterized the state. An ar-
ray of new federal agencies—the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, etc.—signaled not only
that ever more numerous aspects of life had to be dealt with bureaucrati-
cally, but also that, more than before, they had to be dealt with nationally.
In addition to this horizontal expansion, there was also a new sense of conti-
nuity and permanence over time, as “[a]gencies accumulated their files and
procedures and precedents” and the federal and state governments engaged
in long-term cooperative projects such as highway construction.40
Mobilizing the society for war, while not without its problems, had been
a surprisingly smooth and successful, revealing how far the orientation to-
ward organization had progressed. The necessary organization of the war
years, while largely composed of voluntary and semi-voluntary associations,
also cemented the development of an integrated national society, and “a bu-
reaucratic orientation now defined a basic part of the nation’s discourse.”41
The growing emphasis on systematic administration was apparent in
immigration policy as well. Immigration had come under federal control
in 1882, and between that time and the 1920s the body of regulations had
grown significantly, if haltingly. In the debate over the bill that was to
become the permanent 1924 Act, many congressmen argued that a more
39Wiebe, Search for Order , pp. 294–295.
40Wiebe, Search for Order , p. 295.
41Wiebe, Search for Order , pp. 293, 295.
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efficient bureaucratic machinery was needed to replace the haphazard checks
made on Ellis Island, and the Immigration Act of 1924 instituted consular
inspection abroad for all prospective European immigrants. Moreover, the
scientific tone of the racial anti-immigrant arguments advanced by eugenists
connected immigration restriction to a broader trend of emphasizing the
importance of groups or institutions rather than individuals and objective
methods rather than moralistic penalties or persuasion. In his book Urban
Masses and Moral Order in America, Paul Boyer notes that by the end of the
19th century, reformers were shifting from appeals to the individual’s moral
conscience to an “emphasis on the reformers’ technical expertise and superior
factual grasp of urban issues.” This trend accelerated in the Progressive Era:
as muckrakers “marshaled facts, statistics, dates, and names” and “strove for
a tone of objective expertise,” vices like “intemperance and sexual deviation
came to be viewed less as personal failings than as products of an urban
environment that needed to be purified—by force of law if necessary.”42 A
parallel to immigration restriction is apparent: from barring immigrants
only on account of a personal failing (like being a criminal or a prostitute or
having an infectious disease) the United States had gradually moved toward
treating immigrants in broader categories (those who could and could not
read), and finally instituted strict quotas based on ideas about the racial
worth of various national groups.43 The immigrant current, and by extension
the American population, was to be “purified” of undesirable elements with
objective, impersonal methods, devised and wielded by experts in the science
of race.
In conjunction with the progressively greater administrative regulation of
42Boyer, Urban Masses, pp. 198–199.
43Of course, this account did not apply to Asians, who had been treated as a group
rather than as individuals at least since the Chinese Exclusion Law of 1882.
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immigration, economic changes allowed critics of immigration to re-evaluate
the role of immigration in the economy.
Economy seems to have been the crucial reason why other countries of
high immigration, although they displayed concern over the effect of high-
volume immigration on the cultural and political cohesion of the society,
refrained from limiting entry on the same scale as the United States. Unlike
Canada, Australia, or Latin American countries, the United States no longer
had a significant need for agricultural settlers or unskilled workers to com-
plete major infrastructural projects. There was little pressure to increase the
population: gone were the days when a growing population was necessary to
push the frontier westward or inhabit and till large unoccupied (or Indian-
occupied) tracts of land. On the contrary, many people worried that the
cities were becoming overcrowded, and although rhetoric had it that more
people should live on the farm, in an era of persistent agricultural crisis this
was not economically feasible. As a number of congressional representatives
pointed out, the main problem facing farmers was not lack of agricultural
labor but the declining prices of farm products and overproduction.44
Another factor driving immigration, the need for unskilled labor, had
also declined drastically. Many great infrastructural projects, like the trans-
continental railroad, had been completed, and the spread of mechanization
had eliminated many previous occupations. Such technological innovations
not only meant greater production capacity per worker, but resulted in
improved communications, allowing companies to distribute their products
faster and in greater volumes. Expanding markets created a need for more
effective and better coordinated administration of production, marketing,
and sales, favoring large corporations that could handle all these aspects
44Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates; Boyer, Urban Masses; Congr. Rec., vol. 60,
pp. 227–228, 4550; vol. 65, pp. 6524–6525.
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efficiently. As Alfred D. Chandler has pointed out, these administrative
changes created a whole new class of white-collar workers—the managers—
while simultaneously reducing further the need for unskilled laborers through
coordination and concentration of production.45
The trend toward centralization and mechanization accelerated during
the First World War. Immigration from Europe was all but halted by the
war, inducing employers to intensify the focus on capital-intensive rather
than labor-intensive forms of production. As a result, “between 1919 and
1929 horsepower per worker in manufacturing increased by nearly 50 per-
cent, compared to a gain of only 15 percent during the previous decade.”
Even more significantly, although the years between 1919 and 1928 witnessed
a nearly “50 percent increase in aggregate production, overall factory em-
ployment actually declined by 6 percent.”46
More than before, then, capital-intensive industrial production domi-
nated over agriculture and traditional labor-intensive processes. This meant
that immigration was no longer a prerequisite for prosperity, and by the
early twenties even business leaders, traditionally uncompromising in their
support of unlimited immigration, were reconsidering their stance on re-
striction. Immigration might prevent a shortage of labor and thereby help
keep wages low, but it was a tool difficult to wield: although the volume of
immigration followed the demand for labor, it did not do so without delay.
This meant that when demand for labor rose there was a brief shortage,
and when it fell off, unemployed immigrant workers constituted a threat to
social stability. In addition, relying on immigrant workers meant that ex-
ternal circumstances could abruptly reduce the labor pool, as had happened
45Chandler, Visible Hand ; Maddison, Dynamic Forces, chapter 3 and pp. 40–45.
46Vittoz, World War I , pp. 64–65.
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during the war.47
As these structural changes in the industry were taking place, workers,
manufacturers and politicians contended over the question of how industrial
relations should be managed. From the beginnings of the industrial soci-
ety in the 1870s to the Second World War, “fierce debates and struggles
concerning the equitable division of national income and wealth generated
intense political heat.”48 In this context, it is interesting to note the way
in which the ethnic feeling against Southern and Eastern Europeans in-
tertwined with class feeling. Many of the arguments that were advanced
against the new immigrants could be interpreted in terms of class as easily
as in terms of race: the new immigrants were accused of having a low stan-
dard of living, congregating in urban ghettoes, etc. Even more significantly,
restrictionists claimed that new immigrants “naturally” thought in terms of
class, and warned that they would also infect American workers with their
class allegiance and anarchism.
The concern over class allegiance reflected the fundamental ideological
question in the struggle between labor and business: whether collective ac-
tion was the correct way to respond to the challenges facing workers in the
modern, industrial society. Individualism was in many senses at the heart of
American culture, and unions smacked unnervingly of the kind of class soci-
ety that Americans liked to think that the New World, with its opportunities
and egalitarianism, had escaped.49
This insistence on individualism and hostility to movements that were
based on class interests seems to give a new meaning to the vilification of
the new immigrants because of their working class attributes and sympa-
47Vittoz, World War I .
48Dubofsky, State and Labor , pp. 234–235.
49Dubofsky, State and Labor , p. 235–236.
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thies. Unwilling to see their society in terms of class, many Americans found
it appealing to cast the problem in a more familiar mold: that of foreign
influence and race. Moreover, some eugenists also tried to make the ques-
tion of class biological in a broader sense, arguing that inferior hereditary
material was at the root of a person’s failure to climb up the social ladder
and advocating the easy availability of birth control as a means to reduce
the reproductive rate of the lower classes.50
In a sense, focusing on the immigrant provided a way of preserving the
ideals of social mobility and individualism in the face of growing industrial
discord. As the Lynds pointed out in their classic study Middletown (and as
many scholars have shown since), even in the context of the famed prosperity
of the twenties, social mobility was hardly a reality for most workers. The
lives of most laborers in Middletown were much more dominated by the fear
of lay-offs than the hope of promotion. But among the middle and upper
classes of Middletown, the belief persisted that a worker’s unemployment or
lack of success was primarily due to his laziness.51
In the 1920s, the question of class interest was largely (if temporarily)
shelved, and the new consensus sounded by representatives of industry, the
Secretary of Labor, and AFL leaders was that “[m]anagement and worker
are nowadays coming to realize that they are really partners.”52 At the same
time, the steady growth of the labor movement made an about-face. The
proportion of the civilian workforce belonging to unions, having reached an
unprecedented high of 12 percent in 1920, dropped dramatically between
1921 and 1923, and then steadily declined throughout the decade (it did not
50McLaren, History of Contraception; Vaile, Statement ; Dennett, Statement . For a
fuller discussion on eugenics, see section 4.1.1.
51Lynd and Lynd, Middletown.
52Davis, Address, p. 1.
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begin growing again until 1934).53
This decline in membership coincided with a growing spirit of conformity
in the rhetoric and tactics employed by the unions, especially the American
Federation of Labor. Struggling to keep a respectable image in the aftermath
of the Red Scare, the AFL increasingly portrayed itself as a bulwark against
Communism and a responsible partner in the “business of America.”54
The victory of the anti-immigrant forces, then, came about at very much
the same time as the lengthy and heated struggle over industrial control was,
for the moment, resolved in favor of capital. This does not mean that immi-
gration restriction was primarily backed by business: indeed, the American
Federation of Labor supported the Quota Acts, whereas the attitude of busi-
ness representatives was more ambiguous (see section 4.2). But economic
developments certainly had removed a good many of the reasons behind
industry’s traditional opposition of restriction, and the generally business-
friendly and anti-union climate made the immigrants’ working class charac-
teristics a heavy argument against them. Politicians could, and did, hold up
immigration restriction as a sign of their goodwill toward American work-
ers. The Republican administrations of Harding and Coolidge, unwilling
to intervene in any way in behalf of labor and having little sympathy for
unions, felt a need to mollify working class voters and prevent them from
contrasting the Republican administrations too unfavorably with the preced-
ing, more labor-friendly politics of the Wilson administration. Immigration
restriction, along with the tariff, was useful in this project. And by giving
each worker better opportunities through decreasing the labor pool, rather
than by giving greater rights to labor as a whole, immigration restriction
53Bernstein, The Growth of American Unions, table on p. 303.
54Montgomery, Fall .
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emphasized the individualistic approach to industrial relations.55
The societal changes wrought by the rapid economic and bureaucratic
developments since the late 19th century provoked both fear and excitement
in Americans. In the 1920s, technological advances—especially those in
transportation and consumer goods—were largely welcomed; in some cases,
as with the Model T Ford, welcomed with enthusiasm. But other changes,
such as the growing immigrant population and urbanization, were viewed
with an ample dose of apprehension.
Contemporary observers often interpreted the conflicts of the decade
in terms of urban modernism and rural resistance to change: they saw
phenomena like fundamentalism, Prohibition, immigration restriction and
the Ku Klux Klan as the projects of reactionary forces trying to preserve
a Victorian, traditional America. But as later interpretations have made
clear, few of the major issues of the decade allow themselves to be inter-
preted in easy polarities: the Ku Klux Klan drew much of its support from
the urban middle class, support for immigration restriction could be found
among widely different groups in the society, etc. And in many cases, po-
litical expediency, party affiliation, and self-interest—in short, day-to-day
politics—complicated the question of urban versus rural interests.
This is not to say that rural, traditional forces were not significant in
building support for e.g. immigration restriction and Prohibition. In an
attempt to gauge the importance of the urban-rural thesis, Charles Eagles
examined the distribution of House immigration votes between urban and
rural representatives on four roll calls in 1920 and 1924. Eagles found that
simply dividing the votes of representatives between those from rural areas
and those from urban ones (using the 1920 census definition of “urban” as a
55Dubofsky, State and Labor .
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town with a population of 2,500 or more) shows some support for the urban-
rural thesis: rural representatives were more likely to support immigration
restriction than their urban counterparts. An even greater disagreement
existed between representatives from metropolitan areas and representatives
from extremely rural regions (Congressional districts where more than 80
percent of the population lived in “unincorporated areas or in towns of fewer
than 2,500”). Eagles also examined four Prohibition votes in the House
between 1917 and 1929 and found the same pattern, although Republicans
showed more metro–most-rural disagreement on Prohibition than they had
on the immigration bill.56
Similarly, some issues commonly labeled as “reactionary” did in fact have
common bases of support. Support for Prohibition came largely from the
same sources as support for immigration restriction. In a study of Congres-
sional voting patterns, Eileen McDonagh found that “prohibition voting is
highly associated with immigration voting”—i.e., those who voted for Prohi-
bition also tended to vote for immigration restriction and vice versa.57 This
pattern tallies with other research regarding Prohibition and immigration
restriction support: the saloon was often depicted as an institution of the
foreign-born, and weighty opposition to Prohibition came from immigrants,
especially Germans. Anti-Catholicism, a strong factor in nativism both be-
fore and during the twenties, was also often linked to a favorable attitude
to temperance or even Prohibition, as Catholics were often perceived as a
56Eagles, Congressional Voting .
57McDonagh, Significance of the Nineteenth Amendment , pp. 72–73.
The immigration restriction votes in McDonagh’s study are not the Quota Acts but
votes associated with the passage of the 1917 Act; however, it is reasonable to assume
that the issue connections would have persisted the few years between the passage of that
act and the 1921 and 1924 Quota Acts. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 1917
Act was not by far as drastic in its discriminatory intent or effect regarding Europeans.
McDonagh’s results can therefore not be taken as an absolute guide to connections between
ethnic prejudice against the new immigrants and Prohibition support, although they do
support the general perception that an association between the two existed.
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group especially fond of the saloon and drink.58
Nevertheless, neither Eagles’ nor McDonagh’s study lends unqualified
support to a simplistic polarity between so-called traditionalist and mod-
ern forces. Eagles found that if the roll call votes are divided not only
along urban-rural lines but along party lines as well, the picture becomes
more complex: the urban-rural split within the Democratic party was very
strong, while “Republicans failed to divide significantly along traditional
urban-rural lines, or even along the more specific metro–most-rural lines.”59
Similarly, McDonagh found that voting on woman suffrage was unrelated
to voting on immigration restriction.60 The significance of this absence of
connection is uncertain and slight, as historians have not commonly argued
that such a connection could be expected. Inasmuch as woman suffrage nev-
ertheless represented a major change (and a change whose immediate effects
were often overestimated by contemporary observers), it does emphasize the
difficulty in drawing clear lines of “traditional” versus “modern” interests.
The question of woman suffrage also illustrates the way in which practi-
cal considerations rather than broad themes like “traditionalism” steered
the support for different issues. Woman suffrage was, in the minds of
many, closely associated with Prohibition: voluntary organizations advocat-
ing temperance and even prohibition were perhaps the most prominent polit-
ical activity (apart from suffragism) that women were engaged in, and some
suffragists also explicitly promoted woman suffrage as a means to achieve
Prohibition. Many who supported woman suffrage, then, may have done so
less out of concern for women’s rights than out of a belief that giving women
the vote would be the downfall of the saloon.61
58Higham, Strangers.
59Eagles, Congressional Voting , p. 532.
60McDonagh, Significance of the Nineteenth Amendment .
61See e.g. Cooper, Pivotal Decades, pp. 125–127. While the connections between the
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The conflicting responses that the various aspects of “modernity” aroused
in Americans, as well as the way in which practical politics often overrode
the broader urban–rural or traditional–modern dichotomies, indicate that
the significance of the question of traditionalism lay perhaps more in its
contemporary appeal than in its objective reality. The ideal of a Jefferso-
nian, agricultural society was a forceful bastion in American thought, and
the fact that immigrants no longer seemed to adopt it made them suspect.
Neither belief in this ideal nor the suspicion against immigrants was limited
to rural dwellers but was shared by many urban Americans as well.
That immigrants tended to be urban also associated them more strongly
with “urban” vices like crime, prostitution, and drinking. While this asso-
ciation was probably the strongest in the United States, it was also evident
other countries, especially Argentina and Great Britain (see section 5.1).
And like many complaints about immigrants, it served a dual purpose as an
argument against immigration and an explanation of domestic social prob-
lems.
While it certainly was in part a genuine response to the rapid pace of
change, the emphasis on tradition and on the glory of rural America can
also be connected to the growing importance of the national state. The
period from roughly 1870 to the First World War witnessed the growth of
a tendency to think in terms of nations and the proliferation of invented
traditions that bolstered the appeal to a national, rather than local or re-
gional, loyalty.62 Many Western states were finding it increasingly necessary
to interfere with the lives of their subjects; they were also faced with the fact
that those subjects were now in many cases citizens whose political opinions
temperance and woman suffrage movements are well-documented, McDonagh interestingly
found no connection between Congressional voting on woman suffrage and on Prohibition.
On the basis of her voting pattern studies, McDonagh argues that woman suffrage is,
in fact, more properly characterized as a civil rights issue than as an issue related to
expediency and status consistency issues.
62Hobsbawm, Mass-Producing Traditions, p. 263.
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had to be taken into account. As a result,
the state, seen from above in the perspective of its formal rulers or
dominant groups, raised unprecedented problems of how to maintain
or even establish the obedience, loyalty and cooperation of its subjects
or members, or its own legitimacy in their eyes.63
The processes of urbanization and industrialization undermined many of the
relationships that had previously sustained the social order, and the estab-
lishment of loyalty had to be accomplished on a mass scale. As a response
to these problems, “rulers and middle-class observers rediscovered the im-
portance of ‘irrational’ elements in the maintenance of the social fabric” and
turned to ritual, ceremony, and tradition as ways of emphasizing national
unity and a sense of common purpose.64
In the United States, heavy immigration made national unity an acute
question, and as immigrants became more numerous and the society more
national in orientation, the assumption that immigrants more or less spon-
taneously “became” Americans was traded in for the idea that Americans
had to be “made,” a project that took on an increasingly formal character
around the time of the First World War (see section 2.3.2.) In this project,
as well as in the 1920s restriction debate, “traditional” American ideals, as
well as the role of tradition itself, held a central position, even though they
were rarely strictly defined.
Since being an American was not so much a question of ancestry as of
choice, ideals and beliefs were central to American nationalism. This meant
that the immigrants’ tendency to live in urban areas was not seen as a mere
practical problem—rather, it also represented a lack of proper appreciation
for rural life as a central American ideal. Similarly, the alleged radicalism
of immigrants was perceived both as a threat to the social order and as
63Hobsbawm, Mass-Producing Traditions, p. 265.
64Hobsbawm, Mass-Producing Traditions, p. 268.
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a rejection of the fundamental American tenets of individual opportunity
and absence of class interest. For immigrants, these associations meant a
less hospitable climate; for natives, they gave an “internal enemy” against
which to define their identity as “good Americans.”65 And for the society
as a whole, the specter of “un-Americanism” meant a stricter demand of
conformity to a narrower view of American identity.
The debate on immigration restriction tended to employ rhetoric that was
both ideology-heavy and emotional. Not surprisingly, however, more prag-
matic and tangible considerations also affected the success of immigration
restriction in the 1920s. Long-term economic and bureaucratic develop-
ments had both made strict regulation and control of immigration feasible
and even, perhaps, desirable; the diminished need for unskilled labor had,
if not removed, at least blunted business opposition. For politicians, sup-
porting immigration restriction was a way of emphasizing their commitment
to “American values” and to the welfare of the American worker as well as
their staunch disapproval of “un-Americanism” in the form of alien customs,
class allegiance, and radicalism.
65Hobsbawm, Mass-Producing Traditions, p. 280.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The debate on the Quota Acts, in covering issues from economics to culture
and from race to political ideology, indicates the significance of the place
that immigration held in American thought. Few of the accusations leveled
at the immigrants during the debate were entirely new: allegations of alien
disloyalty and radicalism had surfaced as early as the late 18th century,
religious hatreds had influenced attitudes toward immigrants throughout
the 19th, and claims that the “quality” of immigration had sunk had been
made in turn with regard to each new group of arrivals. Racism, though, had
not previously been applied to Europeans, although the idea of Anglo-Saxon
superiority was hardly a novelty.
What was new in the 1920s, however, was that all these strands of na-
tivism seemed to surface simultaneously and from several quarters. Popular
groups like the Ku Klux Klan condemned the new immigrants for their re-
ligious heresy, patriotic organizations declared that they were disloyal and
subversive, representatives of labor wished to restrict their entry to keep
wages high, eugenists claimed that they would destroy America’s racial her-
itage, and all were united in saying that American culture and American
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institutions were at risk if the tide of immigration could not be stemmed.
The diminished opposition (and in some cases direct support) of indus-
try contributed to the political power that these various strains of anti-
immigrant sentiment achieved. Finding themselves both affected by the
cultural and racial arguments against immigrants and less in need of new la-
bor, representatives of industry no longer united in clamoring for immigrant
workers. Machines had taken over many of the jobs previously performed by
unskilled immigrant laborers, and centralized management further reduced
the need for workers. Machines were also more reliable: they did not strike,
nor was their availability suddenly cut off by external factors like wars. The
significance of this reduced need for labor, as well as of the closing of the
frontier, is highlighted by the fact that while many other countries of high
immigration also worried about the impact of immigration on their soci-
eties, none of them instituted restrictions as strict as those of the United
States—largely because they did need the labor and the agricultural settlers.
Despite their rather limited role in the debate itself, economic factors
were significant in bringing about immigration restriction. But although
some groups (most notably labor organizations and black leaders) advocated
restriction mainly out of economic self-interest, racism and considerations of
national unity were what decided the shape that restrictive legislation took.
In the minds of many, the new immigrants targeted by the Quota Acts
were closely associated with radicalism and labor unrest. This equation
was largely accomplished through the Americanization movement, which
had strong sponsors in the business community. Although the point of this
equation was to stem labor organizing, not immigration, it had a powerful
impact on the anti-immigrant climate in the 1920s. The racial theories
advanced by eugenists like Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard and Harry
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H. Laughlin further reinforced the connection between new immigrants and
bolshevism by presenting social classes (and many other societal problems)
as the result of biological rather than environmental factors. These theories
also undermined the faith in ultimate assimilation that had characterized
the Americanization movement: obviously, if biology was the key, no amount
of education or opportunity would make good citizens out of the strange
newcomers.
This theoretical, “scientific” racism intermingled in the popular press
and in the Congressional debates with older prejudices and stereotypes. Few
of the arguments against Southern and Eastern European immigrants were
purely racial; rather, the advocates of restriction freely blended the racial
arguments with claims about the new immigrants’ low standard of living,
radicalism, and general unassimilability. The same was true of some of the
arguments against Japanese immigrants; here, however, race was clearly
the primary factor, and practically no one questioned the desirability of
stopping Japanese immigration. The widely different attitudes that the U.S.
adopted toward Asian and European immigrants were also reflected in the
immigration policies of other countries: Canada, Australia and South Africa
all barred the immigration of Asians though they continued to encourage
the immigration of Europeans.
On the whole, the debate over the Quota Acts embodied, and strangely
reconciled, many of the conflicting aspects of the 1920s. Eugenists and some
congressmen emphasized America’s need for an efficient immigration policy
based on the most recent theories of science, while popular organizations
and other congressmen chose the immigrants’ unreceptiveness to traditional
American ideals and values as their main argument. Still others focused on
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the religious or economic undesirability of the immigrant. Racism, in both
its popular and scientific guises, could be almost seamlessly integrated into
all of these, and “Americanism,” that watchword of the day, backed up not
only the restrictionist argument but the demand for social cohesion that it
represented.
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